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Humwe, Human Rights and Globalisation
“The obligation of our profession is to serve as healers of human conflict. 
To  fulfil  our  traditional  obligation  means  that  we  should  provide 
mechanisms that can produce an acceptable result in the shortest possible 
time, with the least possible expense and with the minimum of stress on 
the participants. That is what justice is all about!”1
4.1. Introduction
The  previous  chapter  concluded  that  in  the  contest  for  the  status  of 
“ultimate victim” among stakeholders in the land issue, it was “the inherent 
dignity”  of  all  concerned that  was in  the  “ultimate  victim”.  This  is  not 
surprising because the human rights culture has emerged in the last half 
century to dominate every other culture known to man. Often, States assess 
and  rate  one  another  by  their  human  rights  records.  Quasi-judicial  and 
judicial organs of the United Nations (UN) refer to States’ human rights 
performances.  Donor  countries  habitually  use  human  rights  practice  of 
target States as a basis for continuing or discontinuing economic relations 
with target States. Citing collapse of the rule of law in Zimbabwe as the 
basis of its action, Canada imposed in May 2001, a sanctions regime on 
Zimbabwe. The sanctions included a suspension of new development aid to 
the Zimbabwean government, severance of export financing and exclusion 
from  participating  in  Canadian  peacekeeping  training  courses  and 
reaffirmed  Canada’s  existing  policy  of  banning  all  military  sales  to 
Zimbabwe.2 In  February  2002,  the  15  member  States  of  the  European 
Union  imposed  a  package  of  sanctions  designed  to  “make  known”  its 
disappointment  with  growing  human  rights  abuse  in  Zimbabwe.  The 
sanctions  include  a  travel  ban  to  the  15-nation  European  Union  on 
Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe and his associates, the freezing of 
their European assets and an arms embargo. Emphasising that the measures 
1 Warren E. Burger – 15th Supreme Court Chief Justice of the United States of 
America (1969-1986).
2 See “Canada imposes Sanctions on Zimbabwe”, at 
http://www.mdczimbabwe.com/archivemat/other/intern/mgsa010513cantxt.htm 
(visited 02/03/05)
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were  targeted  at  the  ruling  ZANU (PF)  leaders  and  not  the  people  of 
Zimbabwe themselves whose plight they sympathised with, the The U.S. 
President George W. Bush issued on 7 March 2003 an “Executive Order 
Blocking  Property  of  Persons  Undermining  Property  of  Democratic 
Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe”.3 The sanctions freeze all property 
and economic assets of the targeted individuals. They also prohibit  U.S. 
citizens or residents from engaging in any transaction or dealing with the 
targeted  individuals.  Most  organizations  nowadays  use  human  rights 
performance  indexes  as  a  means  of  risk  assessment.  According  to  this 
culture, any threat to the dignity of mankind must be attended immediately 
by measures targeted at ensuring both the security of victims,  and their 
restoration to their former status to the extent that that is possible.4 Baxi5 
writes that: 
Although  not  radically  ameliorative  of  here-and-now  suffering, 
international  human  rights  standards  and  norms  empower  peoples’ 
movements  and  conscientious  policy  makers  everywhere  to  question 
political practices. That, to my mind, is an inestimable potential of human 
rights languages, not readily available in the previous centuries. Human 
rights  languages  are  all  that  we  have  to  interrogate  the  barbarism  of 
power.  
International  Labour  Law,  International  Criminal  Law,  International 
Human  Rights  Law,  International  Environmental  Law  and  Public 
International Law, all combine to give us the much needed human rights 
languages  that  articulate  the  threats  posed  to  man’s  inherent  dignity  by 
errant governments when their actions fall beyond what international law 
regards as official acts of States for which there can be no immunity from 
prosecution.6 Established  in  1919 the  International  Labour  Organization 
seeks  to  achieve  international  peace  and  security  by  promoting  social 
justice in the workplace.7 The SADC’s land issue should be of concern to 
3 See “Office of Foreign Assets Control”, at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/ascii-versions.html
4 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23, Article 27 (Fiftieth session, 
1994), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 38 (1994).
5 Baxi, U. (2002), The Future of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, p.2.
6 See ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] H.L. 2 Weekly Law Reports, p.827, at 
p.846.
7 The ILO was established in 1919. See Declaration Concerning the Aims and 
Purposes of the International Labour Organization, 26th Session (Philadelphia 10 
May 1944), Principle II at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm#annex (visited 31 March 
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the ILO particularly because of the threat of homelessness and joblessness 
that it has generated for those people that work in the agricultural industry. 
For many of them, the farms on which they worked also became the places 
they called home.8 In the absence of a coherent, cohesive and legitimate 
land reform policy, many have been left jobless and homeless. Resolution 
of  the  land  issue  would  significantly  enhance  the  chance  of  peace  and 
security in the region to the extent that these workers are rehabilitated. 
The  Statute  of  the  International  Criminal  Court9 (ICC)  targets 
achievement  of  international  peace  and  security  through  prosecution  of 
crimes of the most serious concern to mankind. Arguably, some events that 
happened during Zimbabwe’s land crisis after the Statute of the ICC came 
into force are subject matter of the ICC’s jurisdiction under Article 5(b).10 
Article 13(b) of the Statute of the ICC provides that the Court may exercise 
its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in Article 5 in accordance 
with the provisions of this Statute if a situation in which one or more of 
such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor 
by the  Security  Council  acting under Chapter  VII of  the Charter  of  the 
United Nations. Were the Security Council to refer to the Prosecutor of the 
ICC events that happened in Zimbabwe after 1 July 2002 that appeared to 
violate Article 5 of the Statute of the Court,11 would the ICC commence 
proceedings even if Zimbabwe itself has not yet ratified the Statute of the 
court? The answer to that question might turn on the court’s interpretation 
of what is meant by “in accordance with the provisions of this Statute”. The 
preamble to the Statute of  the ICC clearly states that  the agenda of the 
Court is twofold. First, the Court was established to prosecute crimes that 
threaten  the  peace,  security  and  well-being  of  the  world  The  Statute 
entrenches  the  policy  of  pursuing  international  peace  and  security  by 
criminalizing particular  conduct.  Secondly,  the Court  was established to 
ensure  that  the  most  serious  crimes  of  concern  to  the  international 
community  as  a  whole  do  not  go  unpunished.  The  Statute  proscribes 
impunity for the most serious crimes against mankind. Under Chapter VII 
2003)
8 See “Zimbabwe Soldiers attack farm workers” at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/zimbabwe/article/0,2763,918748,00.html (visited 01 
April 2003)
9 17 July 1998 at http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyEvent2001/index.htm 
(visited 31 March 2003)
10 Discussing crimes against humanity, see Chigara, B. (2002) Amnesty in 
International Law: The legality under international law, Longman, London, pp.6-8.
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of the United Nations  Charter,  “The Security Council  may decide what 
measures not involving the use of force are to be employed to give effect to 
its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to 
apply such measures. …”12 The Security Council has previously referred 
matters  that  it  regarded  as  potential  threats  to  international  peace  and 
security to judicial organs of the United Nations even in situations where 
one  of  the  parties  was neither  a  member  of  the  United Nations  nor  an 
acceptee of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
The  first  dispute  to  come  before  the  newly  created  ICJ  was  that 
between the United Kingdom – a member of the UN that had also accepted 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36 of the Statute of that court, and 
Albania – a State that was neither a party to the UN, nor an acceptee of the 
jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ.  Moreover,  the  International  Law Commission’s 
(ILC) draft Statute of the ICC offers good insight into the potential effect of 
Article  13(b)  above.  The  ILC  proposal  stated  in  Article  23(1)  that: 
“Notwithstanding Article 21, the Court has jurisdiction in accordance with 
this  Statute  with  respect  to  crimes  referred  to  in  Article  20  as  a 
consequence of the referral of a matter to the Court by the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN.” Gargiulo writes that 
“The intent of the provision was to allow the Security Council, when acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to initiate recourse to the Court by 
dispensing with both the requirement of the acceptance by a State of the 
Court’s jurisdiction (draft Article 21), and the lodging of a complaint. In 
addition, it enabled the Security Council to use the Court as an alternative 
instrument to the setting up of ad hoc tribunals”.13 If this is even remotely 
possible, then the complimentary jurisdiction of the ICC, which many in 
Rome had regarded as a cop-out, would continue to surprise as it has done 
already by bringing the Court into existence in just under four years. This is 
a remarkable pace in international law whose speed is often determined by 
the average speed of the red tape of all the beaurocracies of the world put 
together.  Those  that  had  advocated  an  ICC with  universal  jurisdiction, 
particularly  Germany,  had  feared that  complimentary  jurisdiction  would 
dissuade  States  from  readily  ratifying  the  Statute  of  the  court,  making 
unattainable in the foreseeable future the 60 ratifications required to bring 
the Court into existence - Article 126. They had projected a ten-year gap 
between adoption of the Statute and the coming into existence of the Court 
12 Article 39.
13 Gragiulo, P. (1999) “The Controversial Relationship Between the International 
Criminal Court and the Security Council”, in Lattanzi, F. and Schabas, W. eds. 
Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,il Sirente, p.67 at 
70-1.
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itself. But writes Schabas,14 the secret of the success of the ICC appears to 
lie with its complimentary jurisdiction. “Indeed, we might ask in hindsight 
whether sixty ratifications would have been achieved so quickly had the 
broad  German  proposal  actually  been  adopted.  The  problem  with  the 
German scheme of universal jurisdiction is that it left little incentive for 
States to join the Court. One way or another, whether or not they ratified, if 
the Court was based on universal jurisdiction, crimes committed in their 
territory would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court in any case.”15
In 1945 the United Nations Charter conferred on the Security Council 
the  primary  responsibility  to  ensure  international  peace  and  security  – 
Article 39. However, judging by the record of its success, the strategy of 
using  “measures  not  involving  force”  –  Article  41,  complemented  if 
necessary by “action by air, sea, or land forces” – Article 42, may become 
less attractive to the ICC strategy of prosecuting where the threats posed to 
international peace and security fall also under Article 5 of the Statute of 
the  ICC.  Historians  commonly  refer  to  the  twentieth  century  as  the 
bloodiest in man’s recorded history. 
In conflict situations like the SADC, land issue human rights discourse 
empowers the objective victim(s) i.e. everyone whose inherent dignity is at 
issue over the subjective victim(s) who come to the table with only one 
claim in  mind –  their  own.  More importantly,  it  raises  the  question  of 
methodology  and  procedure.16 If  the  human  rights  culture  provides  the 
authority to intervene in conflict situations to uphold the inherent dignity of 
mankind, what standard(s) does one apply in the effort constructively17 to 
resolve past and continuing social injustices that are rooted in colonial or 
some such other  similar  experience of  States?  Social  injustice  has  long 
been recognised as a cancer that threatens fulfilment of man and society’s 
possibilities.  The  humwe principle  appears  well  suited  to  this  task.  Its 
14 Schabas, W. (2002) “International Criminal Court: The Secret of its Success”, 
Criminal Law Forum, p.1.
15 Ibid at 5.
16 Questioning the consistency with the goal of humanitarian intervention of 
materials and procedures used by NATO in the Balkans and the Middle East, see 
Chigara, B. (2001) “Humanitarian Intervention Missions: Elementary 
Considerations, Humanity and the Good Samaritans”, Australian International Law 
Journal, pp.66-89.
17 The International Labour Organization’s (ILO) constitution targets social justice 
in the workplace as a means of achieving international peace and security in the 
world while the Statute of the newly established International Criminal Court 
targets achievement of international peace and security through prosecution of 
crimes of the most serious concern to mankind. In the end, both agendas target 
security of individuals through protection of different fundamental freedoms.
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unrivalled potential to placate the mischief at the heart of the land issue 
with minimal violation if any, of the inherent dignity of the parties to the 
dispute,  lies  in  its  alignment  to  the  notion  of  social  justice  which  is 
consistent  also  with  the  aspirations  and  substantive  principles  of  the 
International Human Rights Movement which seeks to promote, to protect 
and to  ensure  respect  for  the  inherent  dignity  of  human beings  without 
distinction whatsoever. Nonetheless,  humwe’s  restorative, distributive and 
preservative qualities alone are not sufficient constructively to engage the 
Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) land issue. To meet 
the  requirement  of  sufficiency,  SADC  land  reform  programmes  must 
ensure market efficiency, by which is meant two things, namely:
1) Development  of  sustainable  supply  of  agricultural  products  and 
creation of domestic and international markets for the same.
2) Restore/preserve capacity to feed their populations and to supply 
external markets with food and food products. 
To compete in the international marketplace, the agrarian industries that 
result  from  the  land  reform  programmes  of  affected  States  must  also 
demonstrate  sustainable  industrial  flexibility  that  benefit  both  intra  and 
inter-State trade. For instance, landholders should be equipped with skills 
and financial possibilities that enable them to switch crop production to suit 
market  demand.  If  the  market  requires  roses,  paprika  and  other  spices, 
instead of the more traditional crops, to the extent that the savannah climate 
allows, or innovations possible that enable such undertakings, land owners 
should be able to respond to such market changes. This calls for a new type 
of peasantry, i.e. one that is sufficiently trained, skilled and motivated. That 
is  a  peasantry  that  also  sustains  conceptions  of  land  as  the  ultimate 
property. Failure to achieve that efficiency may result in economic failure 
of this largely agrarian economy, triggering instability. In turn, that may 
jeopardise the SADC’s ultimate goal of progressively harmonising Member 
States’ microeconomic policies towards establishment, incrementally, of a 
free trade zone, a customs union and ultimately full economic union with 
integrated monetary and fiscal systems and a regional parliament by the 
year 2034.18 In its 2001 Trade and Development Report, the United Nations 
Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD)  recommended 
establishment of such regional economic unions as a crucial first step in 
18 Discussing the creation, purpose, functions and objectives of the SADC, see 
Chigara, B. (2001-2002) “Trade Liberalisation: Saviour or Scourge of SADC 
Economies”, The University of Miami International and Comparative Law 
Review, vol. 10 Special Issue, pp.7-21.
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any effort  of  developing States  to  break away from dependence on the 
Bretton  Woods  financial  system,19 whose  architecture  appears  to  be 
insensitive to their particular interests. If that view is correct, then in order 
to achieve its goal of full economic union with integrated monetary and 
fiscal systems and a regional parliament by the year 2034, it appears that as 
well  as  implementing  humwe, SADC States  ought  also  to  engage other 
strategies that reinforce its strengths as well as plug its  holes.  But what 
might  these  strategies  comprise?  What  additional  burdens  might  their 
attachment to humwe immediately impose on the land reform processes that 
are unfolding in the SADC? How might these strategies if at all feasible, be 
integrated  into  the  land  reform  programmes  of  affected  States  without 
undoing  the  benefits  and  potential  harvests  of  humwe?  This  chapter 
analyses  humwe’s capacity to efficiently resolve the land issue in SADC 
States.  It  examines  humwe’s social  justice  agenda  and  human  rights 
pedigree  against  the  backdrop  of  international  microeconomics  that 
inevitably interact with it. It argues for strategies to be attached to humwe’s 
agenda that complement humwe to achieve: (1) market competitiveness of 
the SADC, (2) market efficiency of the SADC, and (3) sustainability of the 
SADC economy.  No matter  how just  land  reform programmes  are  that 
target  social  mischief  rooted  in  colonial  or  some  such  other  similar 
historical experience of States, unless they also target creation or institution 
of an efficient and competitive economy, they are doomed to penalise their 
societies until efficient and competitive ones are substituted in their stead. 
The reason for this is simple. We live in a world of globalising processes 
that impose particular limitations on any one State’s capacity to do as it 
pleases  under  the  cloak  of  sovereign  independence,  particularly  in 
economic and human rights matters. The international human rights system 
whose  reach  is  constantly  elongating  is  one  such  process,  and  the 
globalisation  of  industry  and  trade  another,  and  environmental 
responsibility yet another. Together these systems present challenges that 
compel  sovereign  independent  States  to  act  not  only  according  to  their 
national self-interest20 but also according to international expectation.
4.2. Humwe’s Human Rights Pedigree
19 See  United Nations  Conference on Trade and Development,  U.N. Trade and 
Development  Report,  p.118,  UN  Doc.  UNCTAD/TDR  2001,  U.N.  Sales  No. 
E.00.II.D:10 (2001) at
 http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ tdr01ch5.en.pdf. 
 at 118.
20 Examining the grip on State practice of ‘state interest’see Henkin, L. (2nd ed. 
1979) How Nations Behave, Columbia University Press, New York.
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Chapters One and Two of this book showed that the SADC’s land issue 
originates in the injustice of forced expropriation of native land by colonial 
regimes  of  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  France  and  Portugal 
respectively.  The  unequal  access  to  land  that  resulted  perpetuated  a 
stranglehold  of  economic  dominance  of  the  native  majority  by  a  small 
racial group of white immigrants. It severely restricted native participation 
and contribution to the national economy by making them wage labourers 
on what was formerly their own land. The social injustice was compounded 
by the fact that in the agrarian economies of the SADC, the majority of the 
population live  off  the  land.  In  this  sense  it  denied  natives  access  to  a 
survival resource. Thus, redress of what is in many cases nearly a century 
of unequal access to land is inevitable. Humwe’s appeal in that effort lies in 
both its social justice agenda and its human rights pedigree.
4.2.1 Humwe and Social justice
Social justice, the idea upon which the legitimacy21 of humwe may be said 
to proceed from, is a people oriented idea because to describe it, “… we 
must look at what the people themselves think”.22 This immediately raises 
the question whether social justice poses therefore, the danger of political 
knockouts that are based on temporal populism. According to Miller, social 
justice theory has always been, and must always be, a critical idea - one 
that challenges us to reform our institutions and practices in the name of 
greater fairness.23 Humwe’s rejection of private property rights that were 
forcibly and immorally instituted under the shield of colonialism and its 
insistence on a fairer basis of allocating amongst members of a political 
community, human survival resources, including land, immediately aligns 
it to the dictates of social justice, i.e. equity and popular will of the people. 
In  democratic  States  the  popular  will  of  the  people  is  a  useful  tool  in 
guarding against abuse of political power. However, it can foster also and 
perpetuate  tyranny  of  the  majority  over  their  minorities.  Partly  in 
recognition  of  this,  the  Human  Rights  Movement  has  stepped  in  with 
development of “minority group rights” intended to ensure enjoyment of 
group  rights  by  minority  groups  whose  interests  easily  could  be 
21 Franck defines legitimacy as a norm’s pull of its addresses towards voluntary 
compliance.  See  Franck,  T.  (1990)  The  Power  of  Legitimacy Among Nations, 
Oxford  University  Press,  New  York/Oxford.  See  also  Chigara,  B.  (2001) 
Legitimacy  Deficit  in  Custom:  A  Deconstructionist  Critique,  Ashgate, 
Aldershot/Brookfield USA/ Singapore/ Sydney.
22 Miller, D. (1999) Principles of Social Justice, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachussetts/ London, England, p.ix.
23 Ibid. p.x.
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overwhelmed by the majority. Article 27 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR) provides that, in those States in 
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to 
these minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise 
their own religion, or to use their own language. In the Lovelace case,24 the 
Human  Rights  Committee,  (HRC)  the  supervisory  organ  that  monitors 
State  compliance  with  their  obligations  under  the  ICCPR  considered 
whether  a  Maliseet  Indian  had  lost  her  rights  and  status  as  an  Indian 
following her marriage to a non-Indian as claimed by Canada’s Indian Act 
contrary to Article 27 of the Convention. Acts of Parliament are a good 
example  of  popular  will  of  the  people  expressed  through  their 
parliamentary  representatives.  If  the  Indian  Act  was  correct,  then  the 
applicant  would  no longer  inter  alia be  entitled  to  live  on  the  Tobique 
Indian reserve where she had lived with her parents.  Consequently,  she 
would no longer be able to return to settle after her divorce. The HRC ruled 
that although the right to live on a reserve is not guaranteed by Article 27 
of the ICCPR as such, and although the Indian Act did not directly interfere 
with  the  functions  that  are  expressly  stated  in  the  Article,  the  right  of 
Sandra Lovelace to access her native culture and language “in community 
with the other members” of her group, had been violated because there was 
no place outside of the Tobique Reserve where such a community existed. 
The  HRC  after  consideration  of  other  relevant  issues  concluded  that 
Canada had breached Article 27 of the Covenant.25 In General Comment 
23,  on  Article  27  (Fiftieth  session,  1994)26 the  HRC  emphasised  the 
distinctive  and  obligatory  nature  the  minority  rights  contained  in  that 
Article. It stated that:
1) the Article establishes and recognizes a right which is conferred on 
individuals  belonging  to  minority  groups  and  which  is  distinct 
from, and additional to, all the other rights which, as individuals in 
common  with  everyone  else,  they  are  already  entitled  to  enjoy 
under the Covenant.
24 (24/1977) See also Harris, D.J. (5th ed. 1998) Cases and Materials on 
International Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, pp.684-686.
25 On the jurisprudence of Article 27 of the ICCPR see also Kitok v Sweeden 
(197/1985) – no violation; Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v 
Canada (167/1984) – violation; J.E. Lansman et al. v. Finland (671/1995); Hopu 
and Bessert v France (549/1993).
26 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23, Article 27 (Fiftieth session, 
1994), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 38 (1994).
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2) the right protected under Article 27 should not be confused with 
the right of peoples to self-determination proclaimed in Article 1 of 
the Covenant. Further, the obligations placed upon States parties 
under  Article  27  should  not  be  confused  with  their  duty  under 
Article 2.1 to ensure the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under 
the Covenant without discrimination and also with equality before 
the law and equal protection of the law under Article 26. 
3) “The  Covenant  draws  a  distinction  between  the  right  to  self-
determination and the rights protected under Article 27. The former 
is expressed to be a right belonging to peoples and is dealt with in a 
separate part (Part I) of the Covenant. Self-determination is not a 
right  cognizable under  the Optional  Protocol.  Article 27,  on the 
other hand, relates to rights conferred on individuals as such and is 
included,  like  the  Articles  relating  to  other  personal  rights 
conferred  on  individuals,  in  Part  III  of  the  Covenant  and  is 
cognizable under the Optional Protocol.”
4) “The enjoyment of the rights to which Article 27 relates does not 
prejudice the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State party. 
At the same time, one or other aspect of the rights of individuals 
protected under that  Article  -  for  example,  to enjoy a  particular 
culture - may consist in a way of life which is closely associated 
with territory and use of its resources. This may particularly be true 
of members of native communities constituting a minority.” 
5) The  rights  protected  under  Article  27  are  distinct  from  the 
guarantees  under  Articles  2.1  and  26.  “The  entitlement,  under 
Article  2.1,  to  enjoy  the  rights  under  the  Covenant  without 
discrimination  applies  to  all  individuals  within  the  territory  or 
under  the  jurisdiction of  the  State  whether  or  not  those  persons 
belong to a minority. In addition, there is a distinct right provided 
under Article 26 for equality before the law, equal protection of the 
law,  and  non-discrimination  in  respect  of  rights  granted  and 
obligations imposed by the States.  It  governs the exercise of all 
rights,  whether  protected  under  the  Covenant  or  not,  which  the 
State  party  confers  by  law on  individuals  within  its  territory or 
under its  jurisdiction,  irrespective of whether they belong to the 
minorities specified in Article 27 or not. Some States parties who 
claim  that  they  do  not  discriminate  on  grounds  of  ethnicity, 
language or  religion,  wrongly contend,  on that  basis  alone,  that 
they have no minorities.” 
6) The terms used in Article 27 indicate that the persons designed to 
be protected are those who belong to a group and who share in 
Humwe, Human Rights and Globalisation
common a culture, a religion and/or a language. Those terms also 
indicate that the individuals designed to be protected need not be 
citizens of the State party. In this regard, the obligations deriving 
from Article 2.1 are also relevant, since a State party is required 
under  that  Article  to  ensure  that  the  rights  protected  under  the 
Covenant  are  available  to all  individuals within its  territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction, except rights which are expressly made 
to apply to citizens, for example, political rights under Article 25. 
A State party may not, therefore, restrict the rights under Article 27 
to its citizens alone. 
7) Article 27 confers rights on persons belonging to minorities which 
“exist” in a State party. Given the nature and scope of the rights 
envisaged  under  that  Article,  it  is  not  relevant  to  determine  the 
degree of permanence that the term “exist” connotes. Those rights 
simply are that individuals belonging to those minorities should not 
be denied the right, in community with members of their group, to 
enjoy their own culture, to practise their religion and speak their 
language. Just as they need not be nationals or citizens, they need 
not be permanent residents. Thus, migrant workers or even visitors 
in a State party constituting such minorities are entitled not to be 
denied the exercise of those rights. As any other individual in the 
territory of the State party, they would, also for this purpose, have 
the  general  rights,  for  example,  to  freedom  of  association,  of 
assembly, and of expression. The existence of an ethnic, religious 
or linguistic minority in a given State party does not depend upon a 
decision  by  that  State  party  but  requires  to  be  established  by 
objective criteria. 
8) The right of individuals belonging to a linguistic minority to use 
their language among themselves, in private or in public, is distinct 
from  other  language  rights  protected  under  the  Covenant.  In 
particular,  it  should  be  distinguished  from  the  general  right  to 
freedom of expression protected under Article 19. The latter right 
is available to all persons, irrespective of whether they belong to 
minorities  or  not.  Further,  the  right  protected  under  Article  27 
should be distinguished from the particular right which Article 14.3 
(f) of the Covenant confers on accused persons to interpretation 
where they cannot understand or speak the language used in the 
courts. Article 14.3 (f) does not, in any other circumstances, confer 
on accused persons the right to use or speak the language of their 
choice in court proceedings. 
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9) Although Article 27 is expressed in negative terms, it nevertheless 
recognizes the existence of a “right” and requires that it shall not be 
denied. Consequently, a State party is under an obligation to ensure 
that the existence and the exercise of this right are protected against 
their  denial  or  violation.  Positive  measures  of  protection  are, 
therefore, required not only against the acts of the State party itself, 
whether  through  its  legislative,  judicial  or  administrative 
authorities,  but  also against  the  acts  of  other persons within the 
State party. 
10) Although the rights protected under Article 27 are individual rights, 
they depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain 
its culture, language or religion. Accordingly, positive measures by 
States may also be necessary to protect the identity of a minority 
and the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their culture and 
language and to practise their religion, in community with the other 
members of the group. In this connection, it has to be observed that 
such positive measures must respect the provisions of Articles 2.1 
and  26  of  the  Covenant  both  as  regards  the  treatment  between 
different  minorities  and  the  treatment  between  the  persons 
belonging  to  them  and  the  remaining  part  of  the  population. 
However,  as  long  as  those  measures  are  aimed  at  correcting 
conditions  which  prevent  or  impair  the  enjoyment  of  the  rights 
guaranteed  under  Article  27,  they  may  constitute  a  legitimate 
differentiation under the Covenant, provided that they are based on 
reasonable and objective criteria. 
11) With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under 
Article 27, the Committee observes that culture manifests itself in 
many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the 
use of land resources, especially in the case of native peoples. That 
right may include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting 
and the right to live in reserves protected by law. The enjoyment of 
those rights may require positive legal measures of protection and 
measures  to  ensure  the  effective  participation  of  members  of 
minority communities in decisions which affect them. 
12) The Committee observes that none of the rights protected under 
Article  27  of  the  Covenant  may  be  legitimately  exercised  in  a 
manner or to an extent inconsistent with the other provisions of the 
Covenant. 
13) The Committee concludes that Article 27 relates to rights whose 
protection  imposes  specific  obligations  on  States  parties.  The 
protection of these rights is directed towards ensuring the survival 
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and  continued  development  of  the  cultural,  religious  and  social 
identity of the minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of 
society as a whole. Accordingly, the Committee observes that these 
rights must be protected as such and should not be confused with 
other personal rights conferred on one and all under the Covenant. 
States  parties,  therefore,  have  an  obligation  to  ensure  that  the 
exercise of these rights is fully protected and they should indicate 
in their reports the measures they have adopted to this end.
The Human Rights Movement appears keen to ensure that expression of 
popular  wills  in  political  communities,  whatever  form  they  take  – 
legislation, protest, etc., are not allowed to overwhelm the dignity of their 
minority  communities.  This  balance  of  ensuring  that  a  fixed  political 
community is able to affect the actions of its own government on the one 
hand,  and  guaranteeing  of  minority  rights  on  the  other,  underlines  the 
interdependence  of  the  value  that  we  call  “human  dignity”  in  that  the 
realisation of one’s dignity as a human being is linked to his respect for 
others’  human  dignity.  The  realisation  of  my  human  dignity  therefore 
depends on the extent to which I facilitate others realisation of their own 
dignity. Social justice for its part advocates popular will of the people that 
is tempered or mitigated by considerations of fairness. Therefore, not any 
popular  idea  of  the  people  will  do.  Only those  ideas that  target  greater 
fairness  will  do.  The question  this  raises  is  what  is  fairness?  And who 
determines what  is  fair  in each case? Dworkin27 defines fairness as “… 
procedures and practices that give all citizens more or less equal influence 
in the decisions that  govern them”.  Both Dworkin and Miller  appear to 
premise  assessment  of  fairness  on  pre-existence  of  a  fixed  political 
community whose governmental authority is sensitive to manifestations of 
popular will of the people. Such a perception of fairness presupposes: 
1) existence of a political community, 
2) an agency (government) to give effect to that will, 
3) cooperation  of  the  agency’s  institutions  in  carrying  through 
that will, and 
4) democratic  governance  or  some  such  type  of  egalitarian 
governance because where citizens did not have opportunity to 
express  their  will,  i.e.  where  there  were  no  procedures  and 
27 Dworkin, R. (1990) Law’s Empire, Fontana Press, London, pp.164-5. Discussing 
Dworkin’s triad of justice, fairness and integrity, see Rivers, J. (1999) “The 
Interpretation and Invalidity of Unjust Laws”, in Dyzenhaus, D. (ed) Recrafting the 
Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, Hart Publishing, Oxford, p40 at pp.58-65.
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practices through which citizens could influence decisions that 
governed them, it would be difficult to talk of fairness.
Assuming  one  could  distinguish  definitively  all  those  States  that  were 
democratic  from those  that  were  not,  fairness  so  determined  would  be 
difficult to assess in non-democratic States because the question whether a 
population had opportunity to influence the decisions that govern it  pits 
citizens  against  their  governments.  Fairness  so  determined  would  be 
difficult to establish where a State’s human rights practice as determined by 
United  Nations  Human  Rights  Treaty  Bodies  for  instance  was 
unimpressive.  International  human rights law has evolved standards that 
can  assist  us  in  determining  the  question  whether  a  population  has 
opportunity to influence the decisions that govern it. Human rights have 
been  described  variously  as  universal  minimum  standards  that  apply 
against domestic social institutions to uphold the sanctity of human dignity 
across  variations  in  cultures  and  conceptions  of  social  justice.28 The 
emerging right to democratic governance is recognised in major treaties of 
the  United  Nations.  Article  21  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights  (1948)  refers  to  the  right  of  individuals  to  participate  in  the 
governance of their country through participation in periodic and genuine 
elections to be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
Article  25  of  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights 
(1966) entrenches this principle in a treaty that has a supervisory organ that 
monitors State compliance with previously agreed standards.29 Nonetheless, 
Article 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) – 
the regional human rights protection system for Africa severely restricts 
and waters down this  principle,  pointing to an almost  insipid reluctance 
among African leaders to submit themselves to the will of the electorate - 
what Mazrui30 in his Reith lectures describes as the “African Condition” 
that resists positive social and political development at its own peril. Still, 
commentators31 write  about  the  emerging  customary  law  right  to 
28 See Beitz, C.R. (1999) “International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A 
Survey of Recent Thought”, World Politics vol. 51 No.2 p.269 at 272.
29 For commentary on the remit and efficacy of the Human Rights Committee, see 
McGoldrick, D. (1991) The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the development 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford.
30 Mazrui, A. (1980) The African Condition, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 
London, p.xv.
31 See Franck, T. (1992)  “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, AJIL, 
vol. 46 p.86; Chigara B. (2003)“The Right to Democratic Entitlement: Time to 
make real the United Nations promise of democracy?” Mediterranean Journal of 
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democratic governance. This raises the question about the quality that we 
should attach in cases that appear to reflect expression of the popular will 
of the people to influence the way in which they are governed, when in fact 
it is their government that covertly obliges sections of its citizenry to put on 
such appearances of popular will on the one hand while at the same time 
prohibiting  expression of  dissent  by  those  opposed  to  such  tactics.  The 
Zimbabwe  land  invasions  were  preceded  by  several  months  of  riots  in 
urban centres. The riots pointed generally to a disaffection of the populace 
with economic and political management of the country.32 Consequently, 
resort by President Mugabe’s government to the land issue at a time when 
it  was  facing  mounting  political  rejection  of  the  electorate  has  been 
perceived  by  many  as  a  diversionary  tactic  intended  to  focus  public 
attention on a very emotive and desperate issue – the land issue, while at 
the same time distracting them from their effort to hold the government to 
account for its mismanagement of the economy as they had started to do. 
Therefore,  while  the  land  issue  is  an  appropriate  matter  for  the 
determination of affected SADC States at any time that they choose, it is 
difficult in Zimbabwe type cases to argue that it was the popular will of 
citizens and not governmental manipulation of citizens that was at issue. 
For  instance  it  is  widely  reported  that  the  Zimbabwe  national  army 
orchestrated the wave of farm invasions that occurred from 2000 onwards33 
by transporting to target farms the invaders, and supplying them with food 
rations and even firearms.
Dworkin contrasts  fairness  with justice,  which “… is  concerned 
with the decisions that standing political institutions, whether or not they 
have been chosen fairly, ought to make”. In this sense and to the extent that 
it  empowers  them collectively  to  influence  decisions  that  govern  them, 
fairness is people oriented. Fair practice is legitimate to the extent that its 
subjective origin, i.e. influence of citizens over the decisions that govern 
their lives endears voluntary compliance of the same people to whom it is 
attributable. Justice on the other hand, appears to have no regard to its own 
legitimacy  whatsoever,  relying  exclusively  on  the  political  force  of 
established institutions. Where procedures and practices deny citizens the 
Human Rights, vol.7 No.1; Fielding, L.F. (1995) “Taking the next step in the 
development of new human rights: The emerging right of humanitarian assistance 
to restore democracy”, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, vol. 5 
p.329.
32 See “Zimbabwe Riots Intensify” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/976286.stm (visited 27/11/02)
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chance to equally influence the way they are governed, i.e. where there is 
no fairness,  judicial  institutions  can serve to perpetuate unfairness.  This 
raises the question of the quality to be attributed to judgments of the High 
Court of Zimbabwe on the constitutionality of the farm invasions and the 
orders it gave in The Commercial Farmers Union v. Comrade Border Gezi  
and others.34 A major task that immediately confronts States emerging from 
apartheid regimes is how to turn around institutions of the State that had 
been raised to  work against  the majority  of  the population35 and whose 
practice and norms are opposed to the will of that majority, so that they 
begin to serve those they once victimised and ostracised. It is precisely for 
this reason that some theorists36 argue that social justice’s importance lies 
in its  requirement of  the elimination of institutionalised domination and 
oppression.  Could the law courts  of  Zimbabwe, only twenty years after 
independence, and with only minimal cosmetic change to both the bench 
and  the  stock  of  laws  to  refer  to,  be  said  to  be  competent  enough  to 
intervene in the resolution of one of the most fundamental issues in the 
colonial  encounter  of  natives  and  settlers  –  access  to  land?  Should  the 
beneficiaries of apartheid be allowed to use these courts which once served 
to oppress the majority, now to maintain social injustices that the judicial 
system  under  apartheid  helped  to  nurture?  The  answer  to  both  these 
questions must  be in  the negative because of  the obligation in  civilised 
societies, not to obey morally iniquitous laws.37 This was affirmed by both 
the German Federal Court of Justice (Criminal Division) and the German 
Federal  Constitutional  Court  when the legality and constitutionality was 
contested of the convictions of former East-German border guards,38 and of 
members of the East German Defence Council39 that were responsible for 
34 Case No. H.C. 3544/2000 HE. See http://www.samara.co.zw/cfu/courtorder.htm. 
Discussed in Chapter 2.
35 See Harvey, R. (2000) The fall of apartheid: the inside story from Smuts to 
Mbeki, Palgrave, New York.
36 See Miller, D. (1999) Principles of Social Justice, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge Massachusetts, p.15.
37 Discussing the long-entangled issue of the connection between law and morality, 
see Hart, H.L.A. (2nd ed. 1994) The Concept of Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
pp.153-212; Alexy, R. (1999) “A Defence of  Radbruch’s Formula”, in Dyzenhaus, 
D. (ed) Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, pp.15-38; Rivers, J. (1999), “The Interpretation and Invalidity of Unjust 
Laws”, Dyzenhaus, D. (ed) Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal 
Order, Hart Publishing, Oxford, pp.40-65.
38 See for instance the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in K.H.W. 
v. Germany, Case No. 37201/97.
39 See Steletz, et al. v. Germany, Case Nos. 34044/96; 35532/97; 44801/98. 
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the border regime that resulted in approximately 261 deaths between 13 
August 1961 and 6 February 1989 of people that died while attempting to 
flee  from  East  Berlin  to  go  to  West  Berlin.  The  official  death  toll, 
according to the Federal Republic of Germany’s prosecuting authorities, 
was 264. Higher figures have been advanced by other sources, such as the 
“13  August  Working  Party”  (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 13.  August),  which 
speaks of 938 dead. In any event, the exact number of persons killed is very 
difficult to determine, since incidents at the border were kept secret by the 
GDR authorities. For most of the Cold War period the border was heavily 
secured  by  anti-personnel  mines  and  automatic-fire  systems 
(Selbstschussanlagen). Many of the people who tried to cross the border to 
reach  the  West  subsequently  lost  their  lives,  either  after  triggering  anti 
personnel  mines  or  automatic-fire  systems  or  after  being  shot  by  East-
German  border  guards.  These  cases  examined  the  interpretation  and 
validity of unjust laws. In the main, the defendants, all of whom had been 
charged  with  being  indirect  principals  in  the  commission  of  intentional 
homicide associated with the deaths of East-Germans who attempted to flee 
across the border separating East and West Germany rested their cases on 
the  defence  of  reliance  on  statutory  authority,  and  State  regulation  and 
practice. The Federal Constitutional Court held that the reliance of the East 
German border  guards  was  illegitimate  and  their  convictions  were  safe 
because:
… the strict and absolute protection of reliance presupposed the normal 
case of  an act  committed in  the Federal  Republic  under  conditions  of 
democracy, the separation of powers and the protection of fundamental 
rights. The criminal law in such circumstances in broad terms satisfied the 
requirements  of  substantive  justice.  While  it  was  in  principle  right  to 
apply East German law, that law could not give rise to legitimate reliance 
where  it  enacted  gross  injustice,  in  particular  by  criminalizing  serious 
wrongdoing  (i.e.  homicide)  but  then  exempting  certain  acts,  allowing 
soldiers to shoot on innocent and unarmed citizens40
  
The defendants appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing 
that their trials and convictions by the newly reunified German Courts for 
murders arising from the lethal  use  of  force at  the East  German border 
constituted  ex  post  facto  procedures  in  violation  of  Article  7(1)  of  the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Article 7(1) provides that:
40 Paraphrased in Rivers, J. (1999), “The Interpretation and Invalidity of Unjust 
Laws”, Dyzenhaus, D. (ed) Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal 
Order, Hart Publishing, Oxford, pp.40 at 55. (Emphasis added.)
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No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act 
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or 
international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 
penalty  be  imposed  than  the  one  that  was  applicable  at  the  time  the 
criminal offence was committed.
They also relied on Articles1 and 2(2) of the Convention. They argued that 
German Courts had breached Article 103(2) of the basic Law on account of 
the  fact  that  they  had  refused  the  appellants  to  plead  a  ground  of 
justification provided for at the material time in the GDR’s provisions on 
the border policing regime [Grenzregime], as interpreted  and applied by 
the GDR authorities. On 22 March 2001, a Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights issued its judgment in the consolidated applications 
of  Streletz,  Kessler  and  Krenz  v  Germany.41  The  Court  held  that  the 
previous convictions by German Courts and the sentences imposed did not 
constitute a violation of Article 7(1) of the Convention which prohibits ex 
post  facto criminal  proceedings.  Regarding the  law,  the  Court  observed 
that: 
1) the basic rule is that the provision of criminal law must be both 
accessible  to  and  foreseeable  by  the  party  that  now  stands 
convicted of a crime
2) the  individual  must  know  from  the  wording  of  the  relevant 
provision  and  if  need  be,  with  the  assistance  of  the  Court’s 
interpretation  of  it,  what  acts  and  omissions  will  make  him 
criminally liable
3) the post-unification German courts applied the criminal law of the 
former East Germany to the cases, pursuant to the rules established 
by the German Unification Treaty of 31 August and Unification 
Treaty Act of 23 September 1990
4) the East German criminal law provisions were substituted for the 
West German criminal law provisions making it punishable to be 
an indirect principal to an intentional homicide -  Anstiftung zum 
Totschlag - Articles 26 and 212(1) because they were more lenient
5) the convictions of the post-unification German courts were based 
also on international law, particularly the rights to life - Articles 2 
and 6, and freedom of movement – Article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) which East Germany 
had ratified in 1974.
41 Case Nos. 34044/96; 35532/97; 44801/98.
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The Court concurred with the Regional Court’s finding that the applicants 
could not justify their actions by pleading Section 27(2) of the GDR’s State 
Borders Act (Grenzgestez) which, in practice, had been used to cover the 
killing of fugitives by means of firearms, automatic-fire systems and anti-
personal  mines  because  such  State  practice  “flagrantlly  and  intolerably 
infringed elementary precepts of justice and human rights protected under 
international  law”.  The  Court  reasoned  that  neither  of  the  complaints 
against German Courts well-founded because:
1) contrary to the appellants’ claim, Article 103(2) of the Basic Law 
had not been infringed because that provision was an expression 
the principle of the rule of law which forms the basis for the use of 
civil  rights  and  liberties  by  guaranteeing  legal  certainty,  by 
subjecting State power to statute law, and by protecting trust. In 
addition, the principle of the rule of law includes, as one of the 
guiding ideas behind the Basic Law, the requirement of objective 
justice. In the sphere of the criminal law, these concerns relating to 
the rule of law are reflected in the principle that no penalty may be 
imposed where there is no guilt. That principle is at the same time 
rooted in the human dignity and personal responsibility which are 
presupposed by the Basic Law and constitutionally protected by 
Articles 1(1) and 2(1) thereof, and to which the legislature must 
have  regard  when  framing  the  criminal  law.  It  also  underlies 
Article 103 (2) of the Basic Law in that it secures these aims by 
allowing conviction  only  for  acts  which,  at  the  time when they 
were committed, were defined by statute with sufficient precision 
as criminal offences. It further prohibits the imposition of a higher 
penalty than the one prescribed by law at the time when the offence 
was committed.  In  the  interests  of  legal  certainty and justice,  it 
provides  that  in  the  sphere  of  the  criminal  law,  which  permits 
extremely serious interference with personal  rights  by the  State, 
only  the  legislature  may  determine  what  offences  shall  be 
punishable. Article 103(2) of the Basic Law thus reinforces the rule 
of law by strictly reserving law-making to Parliament.
2) The citizen’s trust is earned by the fact that Article 103(2) gives 
him the assurance that the State will only punish acts which, at the 
time when they were committed, had been defined by Parliament 
as  criminal  offences,  and  for  which  it  had  prescribed  specific 
penalties.  That allows the citizen to regulate his  conduct,  on his 
own  responsibility,  in  such  a  way  as  to  avoid  committing  a 
punishable offence. This prohibition of the retroactive application 
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of the criminal law is absolute... It fulfils its role of guaranteeing 
the  rule  of  law and fundamental  rights  by  laying  down a  strict 
formal rule, and in that respect it is to be distinguished from other 
guarantees of the rule of law.
3) Article  103(2)  of  the  Basic  Law  protects  against  retroactive 
modification of the assessment of the wrongfulness of an act to the 
offender’s detriment. Accordingly, it also requires that a statutory 
ground of justification which could be relied on at the time when 
an act was committed should continue to be applied even where, by 
the  time  criminal  proceedings  begin,  it  has  been  abolished. 
However,  where  justifications  are  concerned,  in  contrast  to  the 
definition  of  offences  and  penalties,  the  strict  reservation  of 
Parliament’s law-making prerogative does not apply. In the sphere 
of the criminal law grounds of justification may also be derived 
from customary law or case-law. Where grounds of  justification 
not  derived  from written law but  nevertheless  recognised at  the 
material time subsequently cease to be applied, the question arises 
whether  and  to  what  extent  Article  103(2)  of  the  Basic  Law 
likewise  protects  the  expectation  that  they  will  continue  to  be 
applied. No general answer to that question need be given here, 
because in the instant case a justification – based partly on legal 
provisions and partly on administrative instructions and practice – 
has been advanced in circumstances that make it possible to restrict 
the absolute prohibition of retroactiveness in Article 103(2) of the 
Basic Law. Article 103(2) of the Basic Law contemplates as the 
normal case that the offence was committed and falls within the 
scope of the substantive criminal law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, as shaped by the Basic Law, and that it is being judged 
in that context. In this normal case the criminal law, having been 
enacted  in  accordance  with  the  precepts  of  democracy,  the 
separation  of  powers  and  respect  for  fundamental  rights,  and 
therefore meeting in principle the requirements of objective justice 
[materielle  Gerechtigkeit],  provides  the  rule-of-law  basis 
[rechstaatliche  Anknüpfung]  necessary  for  the  absolute,  strict 
protection of trust  afforded by Article 103(2) of the Basic Law. 
(bb) This principle  no longer applies unrestrictedly in  that,  as  a 
consequence  of  reunification,  and  as  agreed  in  the  Unification 
Treaty, Article 315 of the Introductory Act to the Criminal Code, 
taken  together  with  Article  2  of  that  Code,  provides  that  GDR 
criminal  law  is  to  be  applied  when  criminal  proceedings  are 
brought in respect of offences committed in the former GDR. That 
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rule  is  a  consequence  of  the  Federal  Republic’s  assumption  of 
responsibility  for  the  administration  of  criminal  justice  in  the 
territory of the GDR; it is accordingly compatible with Article 103 
§ 2 of the Basic Law, since citizens of the former GDR are tried 
according to the criminal law that was applicable to them at the 
material time, the law of the Federal Republic in force at the time 
of conviction being applied only if it is more lenient. However, this 
legal situation, in which the Federal Republic has to exercise its 
authority in criminal matters on the basis of the law of a State that 
neither  practised  democracy  and  the  separation  of  powers  nor 
respected fundamental rights, may lead to a conflict between the 
mandatory rule-of-law precepts of the Basic Law and the absolute 
prohibition of retroactiveness in Article 103(2) thereof, which, as 
has been noted, derives its justification in terms of the rule of law 
[rechtsstaatliche  Rechtfertigung]  in  the  special  trust  reposed  in 
criminal statutes when these have been enacted by a democratic 
legislature  required  to  respect  fundamental  rights.  This  special 
basis of  trust no longer obtains where the other State statutorily 
defines certain acts as serious criminal offences while excluding 
the possibility of punishment by allowing grounds of justification 
covering some of those acts and even by requiring and encouraging 
them notwithstanding the provisions of written law, thus gravely 
breaching  the  human  rights  generally  recognised  by  the 
international community. By such means those vested with State 
power set up a system so contrary to justice that it can survive only 
for  as  long  as  the  State  authority  which  brought  it  into  being 
actually remains in existence. In this situation, the requirement of 
objective  justice,  which  also  embraces  the  need  to  respect  the 
human rights recognised by the international community, makes it 
impossible  for  a  court  to  accept  such  justifications.  Absolute 
protection  of  the  trust  placed  in  the  guarantee  given  by  Article 
103(2)  of  the  Basic  Law  must  yield  precedence,  otherwise  the 
administration of criminal justice in the Federal Republic would be 
at  variance  with  its  rule-of-law  premisses  [rechtsstaatliche 
Prämissen]. A citizen now subject to the criminal jurisdiction of 
the Federal  Republic is  barred from relying on such grounds of 
justification; in all other respects the principle of trust continues to 
apply, every citizen enjoying the guarantee that if he is convicted it 
will be on the basis of the law applicable to him at the time when 
the offence was committed.
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4) Nor  can  the  appellants  argue  that,  having  accepted  that  a 
justification could be disregarded, the Federal Court of Justice had 
still not answered the question whether and in what circumstances 
the  act  thus  held  to  be  unlawful  was  punishable...  To  establish 
punishability there is no need here for recourse to supra-positive 
legal  principles  [überpositive  Rechtsgrundsätze].  Reference  need 
only be made to the values which the GDR itself took as the basis 
for its criminal law. At the material time Articles 112 and 113 of 
the  GDR’s  Criminal  Code  absolutely  prohibited  the  intentional 
taking of human life and marked the seriousness of such offences 
by  prescribing  severe  punishment.  If,  for  the  reasons  discussed 
above, there is no admissible ground of justification for a homicide, 
the definition of the offences in the above-mentioned provisions of 
criminal law makes such a homicide a punishable criminal offence.
 
 This judgment compels analysis of the connection between positive laws 
and principles of morality or justice, discoverable by human reason without 
the aid of revelation. It suggests that when positive laws conflict with these 
principles, they become invalid – “Lex inuiusta non est lex”.  An analogous 
argument is that law courts of SADC States could not confer legitimacy on 
claims of exclusive legal title to farms that were created under apartheid 
because the German Federal  Constitutional  Court  required that  for  such 
reliance to be had: 
1) Those titles ought to have been fashioned under conditions of  
democracy where  the  fundamental  rights  of  everyone 
concerned were recognised and protected. This can hardly be 
said to have been the case in apartheid Rhodesia, South Africa, 
Namibia,  etc.  where  laws  were  passed  to  facilitate  forcible 
removal  of  natives  from land  that  had  always  lived  on  and 
dependent upon for their livelihood.
2) Gross injustice must not result directly from upholding those 
titles, which is of course what would happen if the law courts 
insisted on maintaining the  land structures  established under 
apartheid.
3) Substantive  justice broadly  needs  to  be  seen  to  be  done. 
Upholding  land  structures  erected  under  apartheid  would 
undermine the requirement of substantive justice in that while 
international  law  prohibited  apartheid,  and  the  international 
community  worked  tirelessly  to  overcome  it,  law  courts  of 
former apartheid of the SADC blindly and fervently sustain the 
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structures of injustice that remain. International law insists that 
native  title  to  land  subsists  and  endures  beyond  colonial 
conquest. However, the High Court of Zimbabwe insists that 
private title of commercial farmers is superior.
It appears therefore that where judicial systems of States emerging from 
tyrannical  government  are  called  upon to  resolve  fundamental  issues  of 
continuing social  injustice rooted in colonial  or some such other similar 
historical experience of the State, mere application of the positive law may 
not be sufficient, particularly where the overwhelming will of the people 
opposes the outcome of the application of positive law. Arguably, this is 
the hallmark of democracy: the people determining the way they shall be 
governed. But if humwe is predicated on equality of access to fundamental 
resources to all, and enforcement of the collective will of the majority, that 
triggers also the question of the limit of  the will  of the people, and the 
rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself. This is an 
old  question  that  philosophers  have  attended  with  some  illuminating 
observations. 
4.2.2 Humwe, law, and morality 
Writing  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  Mill  argued  that  “… 
everyone who receives  the  protection  of  society  owes  a  return  for  that 
benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each 
should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest”.42 
Although failing States often abuse citizens and other persons on their soil - 
tourists,  immigrants,  etc.,  the  State  system  has  emerged  as  the  best 
protector of individual freedom and dignity.43 There is therefore a sense in 
which individuals have a personal interest  in the continued existence of 
their  States.  This  is  practical,  logical  and  necessary  for  continuance  of 
local, national, regional and the international community. The survival of 
any community depends in large measure on the relative actualisation of its 
goals expressed through its self-interest. Every member of the community 
has a duty therefore to contribute towards realisation of the minimum level 
42 Mill, J.S. (1859) On Liberty, p.141.
43 Projecting the impact on the State system of the growing tide of regional and 
global organising and ordering patterns, see Held, D.(1998) “Democracy and 
Globalisation” in Archibugi, D. et al. Re-imagining Political Community: Studies 
in Cosmopolitan Democracy, Polity Press, Oxford, pp.11-27.  Discussing moral 
cosmopolitanism’s alignment to the State system, see Beitz, C.R. (1999) 
“International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought” 
World Politics, vol.51 No.2 p269 at p.287.
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of communal life necessary for the continuance of the community. More 
successful communities are marked generally by an above average success 
rate  in  ensuring their  self-interest.  Decline and demise of  social  entities 
begins with their failure to ensure protection of their critical self-interest. In 
the SADC, Mill’s fine line of conduct is summed up in  humwe’s practice 
which seeks to enhance the welfare of all agents by seeking equitably to 
distribute among them those finite life enabling resources present in any 
one State, and also to impose upon each and every agent the duty to assist 
their neighbour eke a reasonable quality of life – the neighbour principle. 
That fine line compels in any political community reflection of what others 
are  doing,  and  how  it  affects  others,  and  also  the  boundaries  of  the 
sovereignty of the individual over himself and the limit of the will of the 
people.  In  this  sense  humwe  is  both  a  moralising  agent  and  obligating 
factor. Perceived this way, humwe confounds Austin’s44 distinction of laws 
improperly so called (morality) and laws properly so called (positive law), 
and  represents  the  Hobbesian45 deity  of  law  and  morality  according  to 
which law and morals are identical.  Humwe attenuates the force of law to 
the  service  of  morality  so  that  morality  ceases  merely  to  appeal  to  the 
conscience of the addressee, but to his obligations that are backed by the 
force  of  the  law.  Arguably,  it  is  when  the  gap  between  a  political 
community’s fundamental morals and its positive law is smallest that laws 
are  perceived  by  their  addressees  to  be  most  just  and  therefore  most 
legitimate  and therefore  readily  to  be  complied with.  The Scandinavian 
Realist School of thought examines also the distinction between law and 
morality. It postulates that a political community’s morals are fashioned to 
a  large  extent  by  law.  “It  is  the  regular  use  of  force  and  propaganda 
associated  with  it  that  establish  moral  standards”.46 In  this  sense  the 
habitual  use  of  legal  force  for  nearly  one  hundred  years  of  colonial 
domination of the SADC served to fashion and impose on the majority a 
property,  social  and  economic  morality  that  privileged  exclusive  white 
minority  interests  and  subjugated  black  majority  interest.  That  morality 
substituted  itself  for  humwe  which  had  been  fashioned  by  decisions  of 
village headmen - sabhuku, regional headmem – sadunhu, and tribal chiefs 
–  ishe. Those decisions were backed by restitutionary damages and other 
sanctions.47 The perception by the ostracised majority of the incompatibility 
44 See Austin, J. (1954) The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Weidefeld and 
Nicolson, London.
45 Discussing Hobes, law and morality, See Freeman, M.D.A. (7th ed. 2001) 
Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, Sweet & Maxwell, London, p.868.
46 Ibid.
47 African literatures bear ample evidence of this. See for example Achebe, C. 
(2001) Things Fall Apart, Penguin in association with Heinman, London, where 
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of their own morality with the colonial law compelled many to abandon 
careers and other opportunities and risk their very own lives by joining the 
guerrilla  movements  that  sought  to  unsit  through  violent  means  the 
illegitimate governments and their morals that had been fashioned by their 
laws.  Of  course  some morals  may  predate  the  moment  of  law,  and  as 
empiricists  have  convincingly  argued  that  “if  we  view  society  at  any 
particular  stage  of  its  development,  we  do  find  a  moral  sense  urging 
particular standards of conduct as right or just, even though the law may 
take a contrary or neutral view”.48 However, until the law embraces such 
moral senses and stamps its authority on them and their significance, its 
potential is wasted, just as humwe’s significance was put to waste when it 
was  supplanted  by  the  SADC  colonial  authorities’  own  morality  of 
exclusivity and privity which was backed by a catalogue of laws that they 
fashioned  and  enforced.  Enlightened  self-interest  is  the  basis  of  land 
reform49 programs whose hair-raising travails are unravelling in the SADC. 
The re-appearance of humwe as the dominant philosophy in management of 
fundamental life-enabling finite resources of SADC States shows gradual 
and  incremental  embrace  by  the  laws  of  SADC  States  of  a  morality 
(humwe)  that  has  was  urged  by  the  powerless  majority  throughout  the 
colonial period but rejected by the powerful minority. This created a huge 
gap between that which was moral and legal and that which was illegal and 
moral.  The  compatibility,  and  even  fusion  of  laws  of  a  State  and  the 
morality that is urged is a crucial first step in establishing a legitimate legal 
order.   In  the  SDAC,  resort  to  humwe in  the  effort  to  settle  past  and 
continuing social injustices rooted in colonial  or some such other similar 
historical experience appears to make that crucial first step. The connection 
between law and morality discussed above suggests that law and morality 
are inextricably linked to each other. In fact, they appear to feed off each 
other so that  when that  interdependence is  compromised,  i.e.  when law 
becomes insensitive to moral urges of particular standards of conduct as 
just,  the  risk  is  taken  that  an  unhealthy,  illegitimate  law results  that  is 
opposable to the interests of the people it must serve. Restoration of that 
relationship, appears to have begun in the SADC will follow a course that 
is probably more painful than if that link had not been previously broken 
the rising tribal star Okonkow is banished from his village and has to go into exile 
for a specified period for having beaten up his younger wife during the week of 
peace. “Even if you had found her lover on top of her, that would still not have 
entitled you to beat her up during the week of peace.”
48 Freeman, M.D.A. (7th ed. 2001) Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, p.869.
49 Discussing enlightened self-interest as the basis of law reform, see Freeman, 
ibid.
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because it is not human nature to give up positions of privilege and power 
voluntarily. It is usually the case that the status quo perceives itself to be 
the legally justified and therefore the victim of that which is not legal and 
just. The land issue places affected SADC States beyond Mill’s50 idea of 
perfect freedom according to which, 
as soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests 
of others, society has jurisdiction over it,  and the question whether the 
general  welfare  will  or  will  not  be  promoted  by  interfering  with  it 
becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any 
such question when a person’s conduct affects the interests of no persons 
besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all the persons 
concerned being of full age and the ordinary amount of understanding). In 
all cases there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action 
and stand the consequences.
Therefore, intervention of the law in the effort to resolve social injustices 
that are rooted in colonial or some such other similar historical experience 
of States is best when the law is consonant with the morality of the day on 
the issue that is targeted, and worse when it is not. Because the stock of 
property laws readied for resolution of such conflicts  is  by virtue of its 
origin  opposed  to  natives’  wishes  for  equitable  redistribution  of  a 
fundamental resource, the Courts may not be the best forums for resolving 
such  problems  until  the  laws  to  be  applied  have  been  amended  to 
accommodate prevalent morality and wishes of the majority. 
4.2.3. Humwe and distributive justice
Rawls51 writes that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of 
society:  the  way  in  which  the  major  social  institutions  distribute 
fundamental  rights  and duties  and  determine the  division of  advantages 
from social  cooperation.   Humwe as  property  dogma  tackles  the  basic 
structure of agrarian economies of the SADC by seeking to undo the effects 
of the colonial basic structure that fixed social positions into which men 
were born into and from which their expectations of life were to a large 
extent  determined.  Two  arguments  can  be  made  for  justice  reform 
programmes that target the basic structure fashioned in foreign lands by 
colonial administrations. 
50 Mill, J.S. (1859) On Liberty, p.141-2.
51 Rawls, J. (revised ed. 1999) A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, p.6.
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The first is that the inequalities perpetuated by these basic structures 
are not only manifestly unfair but also pervasive. According to Rawls,52 
such  structures  affect  men’s  initial  chances  in  life  even  if  they  cannot 
possibly be justified by any appeal to the notions of merit or desert.” For 
this reason, any theory of social justice ought in the first instance to address 
both  the  processes  that  sponsor  the  inequalities  and  the  inequalities 
themselves.  Humwe  would start  by  reducing ownership of  life  enabling 
resources to one titleholder – “us all” or  everyone’s - for all  time, with 
“trusteeship  titles”  bestowed  on  all  individuals.  In  this  sense  humwe  is 
consistent  with  laissez-  faire redistributive  theorists’  arguments  that  the 
initial appropriation of resources occurring in nature ought to be limited by 
some principle of equality. Steiner,53 writes that persons who appropriate 
more than an equal share impose an unjust distribution on some or all of 
those that have appropriated a less than equal portion. Trusteeship titles 
would establish the right to an equal portion of the limited resource upon 
which their life depended for every adult concerned. That would in turn 
lead to the right to redress where such a portion was unavailable. This right 
to redress “carries over into a world in which there are no more unowned 
things: in a fully appropriated world, where each person’s original right to 
an equal portion of initially unowned things amounts to a right to an equal 
share of their total  value”54 and therefore a right to compensation where 
that right has or can not be satisfied. The State therefore has the duty to 
establish such a “redress fund” where victims can dip into and into which 
those that currently hold more than their minimal equal portion must pay a 
fee proportionate to their oversize. Beitz correctly observes that “Because 
every  living  adult  at  any  given  time  has  a  right  to  an  equal  share  of 
resources, the value of an equal share fluctuates with population size. So 
there is a more or less continuous need for compensatory redistribution. 
Second, on this view, there is no right of inheritance; when a person dies, 
that  person’s  possessions  become  unowned  and  revert  to  the  redress 
fund”.55 Trusteeship titles to land would give holders:
1) the exclusive right to use land that was not in another’s use,
2) the duty to surrender through established channels, actual land that 
was not under the holder’s use only if another had need of some,
52 Ibid. p.7.
53 Steiner, H. (1994) An Essay on Rights, Blackwell, Oxford, p.268.
54 Ibid. p.271.
55 Beitz, C.R. (1999) “International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey 
of Recent Thought” World Politics, vol.51 No.2 p269 at p.282.
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3) the right to seek more land provided that one had exhausted one’s 
initial capacity and still had need for more, and
4) the right to be treated equally and like anyone else viz land claims 
and land use.
That would guarantee all those concerned that they would not be impeded 
but  assisted  in  their  effort  to  live  off  the  finite  resources  of  their 
geographically fixed political community and ensure security of the dignity 
of agrarian communities. It would ensure that both the minimum standards 
of  equity  necessary  in  a  civilised  community  are  realised,  and  that 
enterprising members have every opportunity to exercise their talents. In 
this  sense  humwe  is  consistent  with  aspects  of  the  liberal  tradition  of 
distributive  justice  according  to  which  distributive  responsibility  of 
resources  that  belong  to  “us  all”  lies  with  the  State.56 The  utility  of 
distributive justice theory lies in that it seeks to inform a 
range of choices whose outcomes bear on the well-being of individuals 
located  in  societies  other  than  our  own.  These  include,  for  example, 
choices about individual conduct such as whether to donate to Oxfam; the 
policies of our own government concerning for example, foreign aid or 
immigration; the policies of international institutions and regimes (rules 
of  international  trade,  international  monetary  policy,  environmental 
controls,  labour standards,  conditions on multilateral  aid  and structural 
assistance); the constitutions of international institutions, as distinct from 
their  policies;  and  the  policies  of  non-governmental  organizations. 
Recognising the potential consequences of these choices, it is natural to 
wonder what moral considerations should guide our judgment.57 
The  second,  which  is  premised  on  laissez-faire  liberalism,  is  that 
distributions  are  not  just  if  they  have  been  arrived  at  from a  previous 
distribution that itself was not just. “A distribution is just when it has been 
arrived at from a previous distribution that itself was just, through a series 
of transactions that have not violated anyone’s rights.”58 Under this model 
of distributive justice, a preceding distribution must be examined to test 
whether it resulted from a process that respected everyone’s rights; and the 
one before it, and so on, all the way back to the beginning, when resources 
occurring in  nature were  initially  appropriated for  private  use.  This  test 
56 Discussing the subject of international distributive justice, see Beitz, C.R. (1999) 
“International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought” 
World Politics, vol.51 No.2 pp.269-96.
57 Ibid. p.270-1.
58 Ibid. p.279.
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would condemn as unjust all distribution of resources in the SADC because 
the basic structure ensured that from the first distribution to the present, the 
welfare and interests of a racial minority were privileged over those of the 
majority.  This  resulted  in  the  physical,  mental  humiliation  of  the  black 
majority and dehumanisation of the elite white minority who were led to 
believe that  vice  was  virtue,  and  virtue,  evil.59 Contrary to  their  fellow 
Laissez-faire liberals, Status quo theorists hold that:
whatever injustices may have occurred in the first appropriation will have 
been rectified subsequently, perhaps as a result of many generations of 
economic  growth  and  innovation.  There  is  therefore  no  argument  for 
redistribution to rectify inequalities in  benefits  derived from resources. 
Laissez-faire redistributivists, argue that it may be necessary for the state 
to intervene to rectify the effects of injustices in earlier appropriations of 
unowned  things,  either  by  redistributing  control  over  resources  or  by 
compensating those who have less with transfer payments from those who 
have more.60
The hope that is suggested by laissez-faire Status quo theorists that social 
evolutionary  processes  would  mitigate  injustices  authored by  initial  and 
successive  distributive  injustices  supported  by  political  and  legal  force 
unless of course, they favour also revolution rather than reformation is at 
best  illusory.  Reformation  is  constructed  by  human  beings  operating  at 
their optimal excellence whereas revolution, whatever its target, manifests 
human beings relying on their basest instincts. According to Martin Luther 
King, the means through which human beings attain their objectives are 
themselves seeds that will blossom and flourish in their midst even after 
realisation of their goal. Literature on the topic suggests that redistributive 
arguments are regarded as being the more plausible form of the  laissez-
faire theory and the more pertinent to questions of global economic and 
environmental  justice.61 In  this  sense  the  justiciability  of  a  distribution 
depends  on  how  it  came  about.  This  historical  perspective  of  justice 
typically holds that “considerations of liberty argue against most political 
forms of intervention in market processes except when required to remedy 
the  effects  of  prior  violations  of  liberty.  (Therefore)  …  laissez-faire 
liberalism involves the definition and justification of the rights that market 
59 For a discussion of the legal allocation of resources according to racial origin, 
and the empowerment of one racial group and disempowerment of others, see 
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transactions should respect”.62 Affected SADC States appear to have a very 
strong case for reforming the basic structures of their agrarian industries 
particularly because historically, their distribution of advantages among the 
population  manifest  injustice  in  that  from the  initial  distribution  to  the 
present one, the rights of the majority to own an equal portion of land to 
live  off  were  not  fully  recognised.  Instead  the  balck  populations  were 
forcibly  shifted  from their  fertile  land  onto  semi  desert  land  and  made 
squatters  in  the  land  of  their  birth.  Because individuals  are  entitled  to 
benefit equally from their country’s resources, resource inequalities should 
be compensated for, but “in ways that encourage or at least do not obstruct 
the  processes  of  economic  and  social  transformation  through  which  a 
society must pass in order to develop the capacity to satisfy its people’s 
material needs.”63 Of course how this might occur is as much a  question of 
development policy as it is a juristic one because of its potential to affect 
private property rights of individuals, and institute a new or revised social 
structure.
4.2.4.  Humwe, Equity and  Restoration 
What is humwe’s objective? Briefly, it seeks to rewrite the basic structure 
of SADC States by negotiating and instituting a more equitable distribution 
of resources so that: 
1) every  member  of  society  has  a  chance  to  participate  in,  and 
contribute to their economy,
2) to ensure that the division of economic advantages is acceptable to 
most of the population – both a legitimating and peace inculcating 
factor in any society,
3) to ensure that no-one feels that they or any others have been taken 
advantage of, or forced to give in to claims that they do not regard 
as legitimate.
62 Ibid. p.279
63 Beitz, C.R. (1999) “International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey 
of Recent Thought” World Politics, vol.51 No.2 pp.269 at 286.
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 Except in a few cases, it is almost impossible, a century after colonization 
to discover whom exactly was moved from an exact location on the map 
and must therefore be restored to their piece of land. Grave cites and other 
archaeological  prints  may  already  have  been  tempered  with  so  that  an 
accurate and incontestable restoration of traditionally held land may result 
in fictitious justice. Besides, even if an accurate restoration was possible of 
land previously alienated from particular  communities,  their  populations 
have grown so much that they no longer could fit into the same “shoe of 
land” as a community fifty or as in some cases, more than a hundred years 
later. Moreover, humwe’s “us all” zeitgeist encompasses all sections of the 
SADC community, and not just the dispossessed black majority. Humwe’s 
point of departure appears to be equal treatment for everyone and equal 
opportunity to everyone. Therefore, all those with an interest in farming 
could ask their governments for an equal portion of land to live off, and 
that includes any commercial farmer that had “lost” his farm.
4.3. Humwe: a Force for all Seasons? 
It is common knowledge that all theories idealise. Humwe imagines certain 
qualities about human nature that may not so easily be justified. Are human 
beings individually  and collectively naturally  altruistic  that  they dispose 
themselves always towards fairness and equity? If this  assumption were 
disproved, or placed in serious doubt, or shown merely to indicate utopian 
aspirations, what then? If it is correct to describe society as a cooperative 
venture for mutual advantage and as a theatre typically marked by conflicts 
as well as an identity of interests64 then the human altruism supposed in the 
humwe principle is shown to be limited and may therefore not adequately 
attend social conflict situations such as the SADC land issue.
4.3.1 Humwe’s deficit 
64 Hill, writes that “There is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes 
possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to try to live solely 
by his own efforts. There is a conflict of interests since people are not indifferent as 
to how the greater benefits produced by their collaboration are distributed, for in 
order to pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share”. Hill R.P. et 
al. (2001) “Global Consumption and Distributive Justice: A Rawlsian Perspective”, 
Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 23 No.1, p.171.
147
148 Land Reform Policy: The Challenge of Human Rights Law
Humwe’s rationale is manifestly clear simple and fair. It is a principle that 
fits Dworkin’s idea of a solution that is “… so obviously fair and sensible 
that only someone with an immediate contrary interest could disagree with 
it”.65 Because any one population has only a finite amount of land at its 
disposal, its allocation to members of the community and access to it ought 
not  to prejudice even the weakest among those that  have need of it.  In 
particular, it must be accessible to those that rely on land for their survival. 
Those united in their basic need for land (both peasants and career farmers) 
have a duty to ensure that none among their membership is disadvantaged, 
to the  extent  that  they may have to  reduce their  own allocation so that 
everyone that has need of it has a share proportionate to that of his peers. In 
this sense humwe appears to target protection of the inherent dignity of all. 
Moreover, the theory of social justice on which the legitimacy of humwe is 
premised  requires  that  the  central  institutions  that  serve  a  particular 
political  community  cooperate  with  the  agency  (the  government)  in  its 
effort to achieve the declared will of the people. Miller writes that social 
justice views society as “… an organism in which the flourishing of each 
element requires the cooperation of all the other members, and the aim of 
social  justice  is  to  specify the institutional  arrangements that  will  allow 
each person to contribute fully to social well-being”.66 This requirement of 
humwe’s  is  consistent  with both principles of  Rawls’67 theory of  justice 
which provide that:
1) every person must have the largest political liberty compatible with 
a like liberty for all – equality in the assignment of basic rights and 
duties.
2) inequalities in power, wealth, income, and other resources must not 
exist except in so far as they work to compensate the worst-off 
members of society.
Rawls68 writes that “These principles rule out justifying institutions on the 
grounds that  the  hardships  of  some are  offset  by a  greater  good in  the 
aggregate. It may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less 
in order that others may prosper”. Rawls’ rejection of inequalities among 
members  of  the  same political  community and insistence on equality  is 
opposed  by  some  sections  of  the  libertarian  movement  that  argue  that 
people’s freedom to enjoy their legally acquired resources is so extensive 
65 Dworkin, R. (6th ed. 1991) Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, p.151.
66 See Miller, D. (1999) Principles of Social Justice, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge Massachusetts, p.4 discussing Hobhouse’s elements of social justice.
67 Rawls,J. (revised ed. 1999) A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, p.13
68 Ibid.
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that  it  leaves  no  room  for  practices  advocated  by  social  justice.69 
Nonetheless, its practice is evident in humwe, which rejects any attempt to 
justify unequal access and distribution of a community’s finite life enabling 
natural  resources.  Thus,  the  argument  is  sometimes  made  that  land 
redistribution programmes will hurt SADC’s agrarian economies because 
peasant farmers who lack both the training and implements enjoyed by the 
commercial  farmer  will  harvest  less  than  half  of  what  was  previously 
harvested  each  season.  This  it  is  argued  will  reduce  foreign  currency 
earnings for the region, and have knock-on effects on other sectors of the 
economy. But what both  humwe and Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness 
suppose is that the preservation of the inherent dignity of mankind is more 
basic in the list  of  human needs than the need to earn thicker slices of 
foreign currency. Measuring social goods by the financial gain that may 
arise is myopic because it ignores the fact that a liberated self-respecting 
person is more capable of attaining self-actualisation than one that is not. 
Motivational theorists70 cite Mahatma Ghandi and Martin Luther King Jr. 
as good examples of self-actualised individuals (the goal to which rational 
beings should aspire to)  because of  their passion for  equity, justice and 
peace. Foreign currency cannot purchase the relative peace and security 
required for other human endeavours to occur. Equity, justice, and freedom 
possibly can. Therefore, humwe appears to apply to the land issue because 
of its credentials of equity, fairness and justice - attributes that the land 
issue in SADC States lacks. 
Humwe applies to the SADC’s land issue not only because of its 
theoretical consistency with the social justice agenda, but also for natural 
progression reasons. Because it regulated property rights in the SADC to 
the general satisfaction of all concerned until introduction by the particular 
colonial empires of the private property agenda that severely restricted its 
application and development, it could be said that  humwe itself had been 
hijacked. During that hijack, the private property agenda that substituted 
humwe ironically  served  also  to  emphasise  humwe’s relevance  to  the 
emerging new property rights. Sallis71 writes that all major philosophical 
69 Discussing Rawls theory of justice as fairness, see Hill,R.P. et al. (2001) “Global 
Consumption and Distributive Justice: A Rawlsian Perspective”, Human Rights 
Quarterly, vol. 23 No.1 pp.171-87;  Dworkin, R. (6th ed. 1991) Taking Rights 
Seriously, Duckworth, London, pp.150-83; Beitz, C.R. (1999) “International 
Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought”, World Politics 
vol. 51 No.2 pp.269-96; Miller, D. (1999) Principles of Social Justice, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachussetts/ London, England, p.13.
70 For a discussion of Maslow’s motivational theory see Chapter 3.
71 Sallis, J. (1987) Deconstruction and Philosophy, the Texts of Jacques Derrida, 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago/London, p.4.
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concepts - being, essence, the good, the One, truth, logos, etc. are values of 
unbreachable  plenitude  and  presence.  “Concepts  are  not  point-like 
simplicities, because in order to be what they are, they must be demarcated 
from other concepts to which they thus incessantly refer.  In addition to 
such  referentiality  to  other  concepts  with  which  they  form  binary 
oppositions, they are, moreover, caught in systems and conceptual chains.” 
Theneuissen72 argues that we experience “communicative freedom” when 
we realise that an idea experience its opposite not as boundary but as the 
condition for its own generalisation. Instead of perceiving “A” and “B” as 
a pair of independent determinant ideas it is possible to show that the pair 
are internally related first negatively, in their contrastive relationship with 
that which yields their self-definition, and then positively, as the belonging 
together in and through that which makes them what they are.73 The limits 
of  the  private  property  agenda  imposed  on  humwe oriented  SADC 
communities are manifesting themselves through the region’s land crises 
which also emphasise the relevance of  humwe  to the land issue. Because 
humwe  has  been  constrained  if  not  ostracised  for  nearly  a  century,  its 
elements have not developed as naturally as they would have done but for 
the intervention of empire powers in the region. This is significant for two 
reasons. First, the contention that humwe applies to the land issue will now 
have  to  be  determined against  international  standards  that  did  not  exist 
when  colonial  territories  were  carved  out;  standards  that  would  have 
perhaps proscribed colonial conquest of other territories, slavery, apartheid, 
etc.  In  1946,  The  United  Nations  Charter  (UNC)  imposed  the  duty  on 
States not intervene in the internal affairs of other States – Article 2(4). 
This  is  still  the  case  in  spite  of  the  current  trench  warfare  over  the 
implications of the ever-changing doctrine of sovereignty in international 
relations.74 Jurisprudence  has  developed  that  makes  compensation 
obligatory  where  the  State  seizes  private  property  of  individuals.75 
72 Quoted in Cornell, D. (1992) The Philosophy of the Limit, Routledge, London, 
p.15. 
73 See  Chigara,  B.  (2001)  Legitimacy  Deficit  in  Custom:  Towards  a 
Deconstructionist Critique, Ashgate, Aldershot, Chapter 4.
74 Discussing the legitimacy and legality of humaitarian intervention missions in 
international law see Wheeler, N.J. (2001) “Legitimating Humanitarian 
Intervention: Principles and Procedures”, Chigara, B. (2001) “Humanitarian 
Intervention Missions: Elementary Considerations, Humanity and the ‘good 
samaritans’”, Australian International Law Journal, pp.66-89; Kwakwa, E. (1995) 
“Internal Conflicts in Africa: is there a Right of Humanitarian Action?” African 
Yearbook of International Law, p.9.
75 See Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraq Airways Co. [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 161; Iran-
US Claims Tribunal (1984) 5 Iran-USCTR 251; Davies, M. (2001) “The Effect in 
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International  human  rights  regimes  and  non-governmental  human rights 
watch  groups  have  emerged  in  the  last  half  century  that  police  State 
compliance  with  the  minimum  human  rights  standards  that  they  have 
signed  up  to.  The  intrusive  lens  of  the  media  machine  now  provides 
twenty-four hour news access about events as they happen anywhere in the 
world.  Collectively  these  agents  work  tirelessly  to  uphold  the  new 
international  morality.  Jealously  they  guard  its  reputation.  Therefore, 
humwe can only ill-afford some of the real  and practical mistakes from 
which other States and regional blocs have often made turning points that 
determinedly focused their collective  zeitgeist towards fulfilment of their 
hopes. Any one of these agents or some or all of them will pounce on any 
significant  challenge  to  that  morality.  It  is  just  like  the  demand  being 
imposed in various and sometimes subtle ways on developing countries by 
their  developed counterparts  that  their  path  to  industrial  development  if 
they ever will reach that standard, should manifest “clean and sustainable” 
habits  when  developed  countries  themselves  relied  on  environmentally 
unsustainable  strategies  to  attain  their  privileged  positions  but  with  the 
result that the shared universal environmental resources – the atmosphere 
and lithosphere’s capacity to sustain human life has severely been reduced. 
Secondly, development of philosophies with as much promise for human 
progress as human rights and democracy on the one hand, and those with 
bleak hopes for peace and security as fascism and apartheid on the other, 
does not occur overnight. It is a gradual process, with its own checks and 
balances that surprise its monitors as well as its addressees, challenging to 
commit  themselves one way or  the other before moving on to  the next 
phase.  Necessarily,  it  is  an  evolutionary  and  natural  process  that  often 
suffers  or  benefits  from the ashes of  a  single  or  a  collective  of  similar 
catastrophic  experiences.  Evolution  of  the  international  human  rights 
regime for instance appears to have been catalysed by the gruesome events 
that led to the Second World War. Those events demonstrated the human 
race’s capacity for evil as well as its tenacity to resist that evil. They taught 
us  among  other  things  that  the  capacity  for  evil  needed  closely  and 
seriously  to  be  suppressed.  Only  at  our  own  peril  do  we  become 
complacent at watching against it. This creates the difficulty that in cases 
where  States are  seeking to  undo and have begun undoing unjust  basic 
structures  of  their  constitution  that  were  imposed  on  them by previous 
apartheid or dictatorial regimes, regardless of the approaches they adopt to 
Private International Law of a Breach of Public International Law by a State 
Actor”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, vol2 No.2 p.253; Harris, D.J.(5th 
ed.1998) Cases and Materials on International Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
pp.601-16.
151
152 Land Reform Policy: The Challenge of Human Rights Law
do that, among those trained to watch out for intolerable human evil, some 
will  immediately  scream  and  shout  at  the  top  of  their  voices  “foul”, 
“illegal”, “evil”, “unjust” etc. Their hysteria is matched in those situations 
only by their previous silence about the injustice sought to be undone while 
it remained enthroned. Nevertheless, they scream and shout.
 The private property agenda opposed humwe’s ethos of communal 
ownership of resources that everyone needed and depended upon for their 
survival.  From this opposition resulted almost  instantaneously, a tension 
between the social, economic and political dynamics of humwe on the one 
hand, and the private property agenda on the other. However, that tension 
was never resolved because it was not in the colonial authorities’ interests 
after conquering a territory to negotiate and reason with the natives about 
how to proceed.  For the  Western empires  Military conquest  meant  also 
conquest of the native’s “inferior” way of life although that way of life had 
resulted  from  careful  synchronisation  of  the  native  with  his  own 
environment that the colonial master  knew nothing about.  It  meant  also 
conquest of his philosophies and aspirations that were expressed through 
his  relationship  with his  land.  Similar  arrogance is  pouring  out  of  land 
crises  that  are  playing  themselves  out  in  Zimbabwe  and  threatening  in 
South  Africa  and Namibia.  Manifest  in  both scenarios  is  failure  by the 
instigators and stakeholders to recognise that part of their dignification as 
human beings is dependent on their recognition, respect and preservation of 
their  perceived  “foe’s” dignity.  Of  course,  more  than  a  century  later 
humwe,  which  has  constantly  starred  in  the  eye,  the  private  property 
agenda, is now challenging it for reinstatement as the dominant principle to 
be applied where land rights are concerned. The tension between the two 
must now be resolved. As will be discussed later, although its reinstallation 
as  the  dominant  principle  in  redistribution  of  land  is  a  positive 
developoment,  humwe could not regulate land rights for all  time in the 
SADC. 
 The private property agenda persued in the SADAC under colonial 
governments  vigorously  promoted  apartheid  and  dehumanised  fixed 
political communities. At the height of apartheid in Rhodesia, South Africa 
and Namibia, even such communal facilities as public toilets, civic gardens, 
high streets, pavements, etc. were said to belong to whites only and not as 
humwe (us all) preferred, for them to be shared by all members of the fixed 
political community. The political and even legal rejection of  humwe and 
misapplication of the  private  property doctrine resulted in  the  emerging 
communities  of  Southern  Africa  an  artificial  and  unsustainable  basic 
structure that fully opposed the fact that the dignity of all human beings is 
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interdependent – more so that persons belonging to the same fixed political 
community. To borrow from Matin Luther King Junior76:
As long as there is poverty in the world I can never be rich, even if I have 
a billion dollars. As long as diseases are rampant and millions of people in 
this world cannot expect to live more than twenty-eight or thirty years, I 
can never be totally healthy even if I just got a good checkup at Mayo 
Clinic. I can never be what I ought to be until you are what you ought to  
be. This is the way our world is made. No individual or nation can stand  
out boasting of independent. We are interdependent. 
The land issue manifests a constitutional deficit in that it was colonial legal 
titles that placed nearly all of the SADC’s land that has the most potential 
for agricultural production in the hands of a small white elite, and crowded 
the majority native population in land with the least agricultural potential. 
However, colonization is now prohibited under international law. The first 
Gulf War was justified on the grounds that Iraq had annexed a sovereign 
independent State, Kuwait. We observed in Chapter Two that customary 
international law holds that where territory is  terra nullius, the occupying 
forces have no other rights to take notice of because no one else has rights 
over the land. But where a people have been conquered, the international 
convention of “conquest and continuity” applies. The institutions, laws and 
rights of the conquered people subsist until an act of the conqueror changes 
that  position.  The  conqueror  can  always  extinguish  the  option  of 
discontinuing  previous  institutions  and  laws  of  his  new  subjects  by 
recognizing  them as  valid.77 Where  legislation  of  the  colonial  authority 
protects or reserves traditional land rights, as did the 1895 joint declaration 
of the British Government and the British South Africa Company that 2.2 
million acres of land should be reserved for native occupation according to 
their  tribal  custom,  and  the  Southern  Rhodesia  Government’s  Land 
Apportionment Act (1930) which reserved 30 percent of agricultural land 
for the 1.1 million Africans; such legislation serves to acknowledge and to 
re-enforce continuing native title to land. Therefore, private land titles held 
by  commercial  farmers  are  subject  to  frustration  of  superior  claims  of 
native  people.78 This  has  been  held  to  be  the  case  in  several  national 
76 King, C.S (ed. 1984) The Words of Martin Luther King, Fount, London, p.21. 
(emphasis added)
77 See Dodds, S. (1998) “Justice and Indigenous Land Rights”, Inquiry, 41 No.2 
p.187, at p.191.
78 Discussing competing conceptual structures of native peoples’ claim-rights, 
seeespecially Kingsbury, B. (2001) “Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual 
Structures of Indigenous  Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law”, 
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jurisdictions79 and  confirmed  by  jurisprudence  of  the  Human  Rights 
Committee (HRC).
In J.E. Länsman et al. v Finland80 the HRC considered the question 
whether  government  grant  of  licences  to  quarry in  an  area  traditionally 
occupied  by  the  Samis  violated  its  obligations  to  ensure  that  the  Sami 
minority  group  continued  to  exercise  its  right  to  enjoy  its  own  culture 
guaranteed under  Article  27 of  the International  Covenant  on Civil  and 
Political  Rights  (ICCPR).  The  applicants  had  argued  that  their  right  to 
enjoy their own culture guaranteed under Article 27 of the ICCPR would be 
violated if government’s plans to introduce quarrying for a rare and special 
stone  from  the  area  where  they  had  lived  in  and  carried  out  reindeer 
husbandry from time immemorial were allowed to proceed.  They argued 
that the contract signed between the Arctic Stone Company and the Central 
Forestry Board would not only allow the company to extract stone, but also 
to transport it right through the complex system of reindeer fences to the 
Angeli-Inari road.  This  would  adversely  affect,  if  not  ruin,  one  of  the 
community’s  enduring  traditions  -  reindeer  husbandry.  The  HRC 
established first that the Sami community were a minority in the Article 27 
sense, and second that reindeer husbandry was an essential element of their 
culture. It  noted that economic activities may come within the ambit  of 
Article  27  if  they  are  an  essential  element  of  the  culture  of  an  ethnic 
community.81  It held that quarrying on the slopes of Mt.  Riutusvaara, in 
the amount that had already taken place, did not constitute a denial of the 
authors’  right,  under  Article  27,  to  enjoy  their  own culture  particularly 
because the interests of the  Muotkatunturi Herdsmens’  Committee and of 
the  applicants  were  considered  during  the  proceedings  leading  to  the 
delivery of the quarrying permit, and the applicants consulted during the 
proceedings, and that reindeer herding in the area did not  appear to the 
Committee  to  have  been  adversely  affected  by  such  quarrying  as  has 
occurred.82 This decision suggests that where governments actually consult 
with  the  community  leaders  in  order  to  reach  a  decision  that  is  later 
in Alston, P. (2001) People’s Rights, Oxford University Press, pp.69-110. He 
writes that some legal claims raised by indigenous peoples are sui generis and have 
a distinct conceptual structure. Ibid. at p.70.
79 Including Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
80 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994).
81 See also Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, 547/1993 (10 December 1992), 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993, para. 9.3.
Kitok v. Sweden, 197/1985 (27 July 1988) UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/43/40) 
paragraph 9.2.
82 para. 9.6.
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regarded by the target community as a breach of their rights, unless that 
consultation  was  a  sham,  claims  of  governmental  breach  of  the 
community’s human rights may be difficult to sustain, particularly where 
no significant damage to the interests of the target community can be seen 
to have occurred. 
The right to enjoy one’s culture cannot be determined in abstracto but has 
to be placed in context. In this connection, the Committee observes that 
Article  27  does  not  only  protect  traditional  means  of  livelihood  of 
national  minorities,  as  indicated  in  the  State  party’s  submission. 
Therefore, that the authors may have adapted their methods of reindeer 
herding over the years and practice it with the help of modern technology 
does  not  prevent  them  from  invoking  Article  27  of  the  Covenant. 
Furthermore,  mountain  Riutusvaara continues  to  have  a  spiritual 
significance  relevant  to  their  culture.  The  Committee  also  notes  the 
concern of the authors that the quality of slaughtered reindeer could be 
adversely affected by a disturbed environment.83
A State  may understandably  wish  to  encourage  development  or  allow 
economic activity by enterprises. The scope of its freedom to do so is not 
to be assessed by reference to a margin of appreciation, but by reference 
to the obligations it has undertaken in Article 27. Article 27 requires that a 
member of a minority shall not be denied his right to enjoy his culture. 
Thus, measures whose impact amount to a denial of the right will not be 
compatible with the obligations under Article 27. However, measures that 
have a certain limited impact on the way of life of persons belonging to a 
minority will not necessarily amount to a denial of the right under Article 
27.84
The question that therefore arises in this case is whether the impact of the 
quarrying on Mount Riutusvaara is so substantial that it does effectively 
deny to the authors the right to enjoy their cultural rights in that region. 
The Committee recalls paragraph 7 of its General Comment on Article 27, 
according to which minorities or indigenous groups have a right to the 
protection of traditional activities such as hunting, fishing or, as in the 
instant  case,  reindeer  husbandry,  and that  measures  must  be  taken “to 
ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in 
decisions which affect them”.85
However,  the  issue  in  the  case  was  not  the  ownership  of  the  land  in 
question, but the protection of a right that attached to its use. In resolving 
this question, the Committee restricted itself to that question alone although 
83 para. 9.3. See also Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, 547/1993 (10 
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it had noted earlier in the proceedings that “… the question of ownership of 
lands traditionally used by the Samis is disputed between the Government 
and the Sami community”.86 Would the Committee have reached a similar 
decision if there were no ownership dispute in the background, and the land 
belonged to the minority group in question? Two cases are instructive. The 
first is Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada.87 
In  that  case,  Chief  Ominayak,  the  leader  and  representative  of  the 
Lubicon Lake  Band –  a  Cree  Indian  band living  within  the  borders  of 
Canada in the Province of Alberta, alleged violation by the Government of 
Canada of the Band’s right to self-determination and by virtue of that right, 
the Band’s right to dispose freely of its natural wealth and resources and 
not to be deprived of its own means of subsistence. The Lubicon Lake Band 
is  a  self-identified,  relatively  autonomous,  socio-cultural  and  economic 
group. Its members have continuously inhabited, hunted, trapped and fished 
in a large area encompassing approximately 10,000 square kilometres in 
northern Alberta since time immemorial. Since their territory is relatively 
inaccessible, they had had, until then, little contact with non-Indian society. 
Band members speak Cree as their primary language. Many do not speak, 
read  or  write  English.  The  Band  continues  to  maintain  its  traditional 
culture, religion, political structure and subsistence economy. By the Indian 
Act  of  1970 and Treaty 8 of  21 June 1899 (concerning aboriginal  land 
rights in northern Alberta), the Canadian government recognized the right 
of the original inhabitants of that area to continue their traditional way of 
life. General international law regards this type of action as entrenching 
native claims to land whatever else the settler administration does because 
where the colonizer through legislation protects or reserves traditional land 
rights,  such  reservations  are  an  acknowledgment  and  re-enforcement  of 
continuing native common law land rights or native title.88 Therefore, the 
Band  appeared  to  have  a  prima  facie claim  to  the  territory  they  held. 
However,  despite  these laws and agreements,  the  Canadian Government 
allowed the provincial government of Alberta to expropriate the territory of 
the  Lubicon Lake Band for the benefit of private corporate interests (e.g. 
leases for oil and gas exploration). The claimant argued that this action of 
the government of Canada:
1) violated the Band’s right to determine freely its political status and 
to  pursue  its  economic,  social  and  cultural  development,  as 
guaranteed by Article 1, paragraph 1, of the ICCPR; 
86 para. 2.2
87 167/1984 (26 March 1990) UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40)
88 See Chapter 2.
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2) violated Article 1, paragraph 2, which grants all peoples the right to 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources; 
3) risked destruction of the Band’s environment which had already 
begun and was going unabated.89 As a consequence, it undermined 
the Band’s economic base and deprived the Band of its means to 
subsist,  and  of  its  enjoyment  of  the  right  of  self-determination 
guaranteed in Article 1 of the ICCPR. He wrote:
“... the diet of the people has undergone dramatic changes with the loss of 
their  game,  their  reliance  on  less  nutritious  processed  foods,  and  the 
spectre of alcoholism, previously unheard of in this community and which 
is now overwhelming it  ....  As a result of these drastic changes in the 
community’s  physical  existence,  the  basic  health  and  resistance  to 
infection of community members has deteriorated dramatically. The lack 
of  running  water  and  sanitary  facilities  in  the  community,  needed  to 
replace the traditional systems of water and sanitary management ....  is 
leading to the development of diseases associated with poverty and poor 
sanitary  and  health  conditions.  This  situation  is  evidenced  by  the 
astonishing increase in the number of abnormal births and by the outbreak 
of tuberculosis, affecting approximately one third of the community.”90
Therefore,  the  issue  was  whether  the  recent  expropriation  by  the 
Government of the Province of Alberta of the Band’s land for commercial 
interest (e.g. leases for oil and gas exploration) constituted a violation of 
the Band’s right “to enjoy its own culture”. 
A  technical  difficulty  arose  in  that  the  applicant,  being  an 
individual, could not invoke “self-determination” as an individual cannot 
invoke the Committee’s jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol when the 
alleged violation concerns a collective right.91 The Committee resolved this 
problem  in  favour  of  the  applicant  by  taking  a  proactive  approach  to 
enforcement of Convention. It argued that because the ICCPR recognizes 
and protects in most resolute terms a people’s right of self-determination 
and its right to dispose of its natural resources, as an essential condition for 
the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for 
the promotion and strengthening of those rights, and because the facts as 
submitted  might  raise  issues  under  other  Articles  of  the  Covenant, 
including Article 27, and to the extent that the author and other members of 
the  Lubicon Lake Band were affected by the events which the author has 
described,  “these  issues  should  be  examined  on  the  merits,  in  order  to 
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the Covenant”.92  This flexibility of the quasi-judicial supervisory organ to 
deduce  from  the  facts  presented  in  a  communication  complaints  about 
possible  breaches  by  the  State  of  its  Conventions  obligations  that  the 
applicant had not himself foreseen is remarkable. On the one hand, it may 
serve to ensure the widest possible monitoring of States parties compliance 
with the Convention if every communication is given such a through and 
detailed  combing,  going  beyond  the  exact  breaches  alleged  by  the 
applicant.  This might also explain the two to three-year delay period in 
hearing a case by the Committee. States might opt to remedy complaints 
before they reach the Committee’s thorough and detailed examination table 
where the facts presented by the applicant may reveal worse than they first 
thought. It is not the case that States would rather not know the extent to 
which they fall short of their obligations under the ICCPR and therefore 
how much more they need to do locally in order to rise to the standards of 
the ICCPR, merely that States would much rather not attract the stigma in 
the  international  community  of  “human  rights  abuser”.  As  President 
Mugabe is perhaps coming to terms with, the range of penalties that that 
may attract; who delivers them, and in what package, etc., may all be too 
surprising and bewildering.  On the other hand, it might encourage “fishing 
applications” that are based only on the hope that the Committee will find 
something that will stick. Were this to occur, then it would choke up the 
system,  and  delay  deserving  cases  from  receiving  a  quicker  hearing. 
Development of jurisprudence on the ICCPR would become parchy and not 
smooth and elongated. Notwithstanding, the Committee decided on 22 July 
1987, that the communication was admissible in so far as it  might raise 
issues under Article 27 or other Articles of the Covenant.  Although the 
applicant had not requested a territorial rights decision in favour of the the 
Lubicon Lake Band, but a mere declaration that: 
1) The Band’s existence was seriously threatened by the oil and gas 
development that had been allowed to proceed unchecked on their 
traditional  hunting  grounds  and  in  complete  disregard  for  the 
human community inhabiting the area;
2) Canada was responsible for the current state of affairs and should 
therefore co-operate in its resolution in accordance with Article 1 
of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights;
The  HRC  held  that  historical  inequities  and  certain  more  recent 
developments threaten the  way of  life  and culture  of  the  Lubicon  Lake 
92 See para.13.4.
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Band,  and constitute a violation of Article 27 so long as they continue. 
Therefore, the State party should rectify the situation by a remedy that the 
Committee  deems  appropriate  within  the  meaning  of  Article  2  of  the 
Covenant.93 This decision rejects the proposition that where the colonizer 
through legislation initially protects or reserves traditional land rights he 
can then at a later date, undo continuing native common law land rights for 
reasons that may add to the general welfare of the State. In his individual 
opinion,  Nisuke Ando favoured the privileging of economic interests over 
social,  cultural  and  other  interests  and  the  pursuit  of  inferred  majority 
interests over those of the minority. Although he acknowledges that it is not 
impossible that a certain culture is closely linked to a particular way of life 
and that industrial exploration of natural resources may affect the Band’s 
traditional way of life, including hunting and fishing, he thought that: 
the right to enjoy one’s own culture should not be understood to imply 
that the Band’s traditional way of life must be preserved intact at all costs. 
Past history of mankind bears out that technical development has brought 
about various changes to existing ways of life and thus affected a culture 
sustained thereon. Indeed, outright refusal by a group in a given society to 
change its traditional way of life may hamper the economic development 
of  the society as  a  whole.  For this reason I would like to express my 
reservation  to  the  categorical  statement  that  recent  developments  have 
threatened the life of the Lubicon Lake Band and constitute a violation of 
Article 27.
However,  in  J.G.A.  Diergaardt  (late  Captain  of  the  Rehoboth  Baster  
Community)  et  al.  v  Namibia,94 the  Committee  required  that  such  an 
application of Article 27 required firm evidence of a relationship between 
the claimant’s way of life and the lands covered by their claim. The HRC 
observed that “Although the link of the Rehoboth community to the lands 
in question dates back some 125 years, it is not the result of a relationship 
that would have given rise to a distinctive culture.”95 
The claimants were members of the Rehoboth Baster Community, 
descendants of indigenous Khoi and Afrikaans settlers who originally lived 
in the Cape, but moved to Namibia in 1872. They were governed by their 
“paternal laws,” which provided for the election of a Captain, and for rights 
and duties of citizens. The community which numbers some 35,000 people 
occupied a  total  surface area of  some14,216 square  kilometres south of 
Windhoek. In this area the Basters developed their own society, culture, 
93 See para.33.
94 760/1997  (6 September 2000) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997 
95 Ibid. para10.6.
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language  and  economy,  with  which  they  largely  sustained  their  own 
institutions, such as schools and community centres. Their independence 
continued  throughout  the  German  colonial  reign  of  Namibia,  and  was 
recognized by South Africa when it became the mandatory for South West 
Africa.  The claimants had alleged that the land of their  community had 
been expropriated and that, as a consequence, their rights as a minority are 
being violated since their culture is bound up with the use of communal 
land exclusive to members of their community in violation of Article 27 of 
the Covenant.  Namibia had gained independence on 21 March 1990.  In 
1996,   the  Government  enacted  the  law on  regional  government  which 
effectively brought to an end the 124 year-long existence of Rehoboth as a 
continuously  organised  territory.  The  territory  is  now divided  over  two 
regions, thus preventing the Basters from effectively participating in public 
life on a regional basis, since they are a minority in both new districts. The 
HRC held that “… although the Rehoboth community had borne distinctive 
properties as to the historical forms of self-government, the authors have 
failed to demonstrate how these factors would be based on their way of 
raising  cattle.  The  Committee  therefore  finds  that  there  has  been  no 
violation of Article 27 of the Covenant in the present case.”
Apirana  Mahuika  et  al.  v  New  Zealand96 arose  out  of  the 
Government of New Zealand’s introduction of the Fisheries’ Settlement – a 
revision of longstanding Maori Fisheries Treaty rights of 1840 which had 
hitherto guaranteed “The full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their 
lands, forests, fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or 
individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same 
in  their  possession...”97  The  applicants  claimed  inter-alia that  New 
Zealand’s the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 
breached the State party’s obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. In this 
context,  the  claimants  argued  that  the  right  to  self-determination  under 
Article 1 of the Covenant is only effective when people have access to and 
control  over  their  resources.  They  argued  further  that  the  proposals 
contemplated in the Fisheries’ Settlement threatened their way of life and 
the  culture  of  their  tribes,  in  violation  of  Article  27  of  the  Covenant 
particularly  because  their  traditional  culture  comprises  commercial 
elements and does not distinguish clearly between commercial and other 
fishing. They claim that the new legislation removes their right to pursue 
traditional fishing other than in the limited sense preserved by the law and 
that the commercial aspect of fishing is being denied to them in exchange 
for a share in fishing quota.  The Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) 
96 547/1993 (10 December 1992), UN Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993
97 Ibid. para.5.1.
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Settlement Bill 1992 became law on 14 December 1992. The preamble to 
the Act states that: 
The implementation of the Deed through legislation and the continuing 
relationship between the Crown and Maori  would constitute  a full  and 
final  settlement  of  all  Maori  claims  to  commercial  fishing  rights  and 
would change the status of non-commercial fishing rights so that they no 
longer give rise to rights in Maori or obligations on the Crown having 
legal  effect  but  would  continue  to  be  subject  to  the  principles  of  the 
Treaty of Waitangi and give rise to Treaty obligations on the Crown. 
The Act provides inter-alia for the payment of NZ$ 150,000,000 to Maori, 
and states in section 9, that “all claims (current and future) by Maori in 
respect  of  commercial  fishing  ....  are  hereby  finally  settled”  and 
accordingly: 
The obligations of the Crown to Maori in respect of commercial fishing 
are  hereby  fulfilled,  satisfied,  and  discharged;  and  no  court  or 
tribunal shall have jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of such 
claims, the existence of rights and interests of Maori in commercial 
fishing, or  the quantification thereof,  ....  All claims (current  and 
future) in respect of, or directly or indirectly based on, rights and 
interests  of  Maori  in  commercial  fishing  are  hereby  fully  and 
finally settled, satisfied and discharged.
An  agreement  between  the  Maori  and  the  Government  had  led  to  the 
Settlement. The effect of the Settlement was threefold. First it entrenched 
the Quota Management System introduced by the Government in a bid to 
ensure sustainability of the resource although both the Waitangi tribunal 
which enforced the 1840 Treaty between the Crown and the Maoris and the 
New Zealand High Court  and Court of  Appeal  had in several  decisions 
between  1987  and  1990  found  it  to  be  in  conflict  with  the  Treaty  of 
Waitangi because it gave exclusive possession of property rights in fishing 
to non-Maouri in breach of s. 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983.98 Secondly, it 
ensured that the Maori had greater access to a greater percentage of quota, 
effectively  guaranteeing  them  possession  of  the  fisheries.  Thirdly, 
regarding commercial fisheries, Maori authority and traditional methods of 
control  as  recognised  in  the  Treaty  were  replaced  by  a  new  control 
structure, an entity in which the Maori not only had the power to safeguard 
98 Ibid. para.6.3.
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their interests in fisheries but also effectively to control the industry.99 In 
regard to non-commercial fisheries, the Crown obligations under the Treaty 
of  Waitangi  continued,  and  regulations  were  made  that  recognised  and 
provided for customary food gathering. 
The  HRC considered the  question  whether  the  claimants’  rights 
under  Article  27  of  the  Covenant  had  been  violated  by  the  Fisheries 
Settlement,  as  reflected  in  the  Deed  of  Settlement  and  the  Treaty  of 
Waitangi  (Fisheries  Claims)  Settlement  Act  1992.  It  reiterated  that 
economic activities may come within the ambit of Article 27, if they are an 
essential element of the culture of a community and that the right to enjoy 
one’s culture cannot be determined  in abstracto but has to be placed in 
context. It reasoned that Article 27 does not only protect traditional means 
of livelihood of minorities, but allows also for adaptation of those means to 
the modern way of life and ensuing technology. In this case the legislation 
introduced by the State affected, in various ways, the possibilities for Maori 
to  engage  in  commercial  and  non-commercial  fishing.  The  question  is 
whether this constituted a denial of rights. The Committee reminded itself 
that:
A State  may understandably  wish  to  encourage  development  or  allow 
economic activity by enterprises. The scope of its freedom to do so is not 
to be assessed by reference to a margin of appreciation, but by reference 
to the obligations it has undertaken in Article 27. Article 27 requires that a 
member  of  a  minority  shall  not  be  denied  his  right  to  enjoy  his  own 
culture. Thus, measures whose impact amount to a denial of the right will 
not  be  compatible  with  the  obligations  under  Article  27.  However, 
measures that have a certain limited impact on the way of life of persons 
belonging to a minority will not necessarily amount to a denial of the right 
under Article 27.100
 
The HRC concluded that the facts before it did not reveal a breach of any 
of the Articles of the Covenant,101 but that the Government of New Zealand 
had a continuing duty to ensure that the cultural and religious significance 
of fishing for Maori received due attention in the implementation of the 
Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act.102 What is clear from 
these cases is the fact that:
99 Ibid. para.9.7.
100 Ibid. para. 9.4.
101 Ibid. para.10.
102 Ibid. para.9.9.
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1) Continuing native claims to land that they have lived off from time 
immemorial are not easily extinguished. On the contrary they are 
enduring.  Quite  apart  from  property  law  related  doctrines, 
emergent  doctrines  of  international  human  rights  law  such  as 
article 27 cultural rights can be invoked in support of native claims 
to land. 
2) The HRC’s jurisprudence insists  that  the right  of  members  of  a 
minority to enjoy their culture under Article 27 includes protection 
to a particular way of life associated with the use of land resources 
through economic activities, such as hunting and fishing, especially 
in the case of indigenous peoples.
3) Where the rights protected under Article 27 of the ICCPR connect 
with economic interests rooted in native claims to property rights, a 
rearrangement  of  such  property  rights  by  the  State  in  close 
consultation  with the  indigenous group103 does  not  violate  those 
initial rights where the impact of the intervention is not substantial 
enough effectively to deny the community the right to enjoy their 
cultural  rights,104 or  where  intervention  of  the  State  actually 
resulted in greater economic empowerment and greater control of 
the “resource” by the target community 
In the HRC’s jurisprudence the significance of property rights that derive 
from native  claims  to  property  lies  in  the  utilisation  of  their  economic 
potential  to  the  particular  community,  so  that  where  those  rights  are 
marginally  disturbed  by  intervention  of  the  State,  the  bigger  economic 
context is preferred to the smaller exclusive one. For humwe inspired land 
reform programmes, the bigger context appears to be economic viability of 
affected SADC States and with that, the SADC itself, so that mere land 
redistribution that does not excite economic regeneration opposes one of 
the  central  tenets  of  the  human  rights  agenda,  i.e.  preservation  of  the 
dignity  of  the  human  spirit.  For  this  reason,  humwe  inspired  land 
redistribution programmes ought to carry with them a much bigger agenda, 
the  exploitation  of  economic  value  and  potential  of  the  land.  This  is 
103 Paragraph 7 of the HRC’s General Comment on Article 27 states that minorities 
or indigenous groups have a right to the protection of traditional activities such as 
hunting, fishing or, as in the instant case, reindeer husbandry, and that measures 
must be taken “to ensure the effective participation of members of minority 
communities in decisions which affect them”.
104 See Länsman et al. v. Finland, 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 
(1994) para. 9.5.
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consistent  with  the  much  debated  right  to  development,  especially  for 
developing countries.   
4.3.2 The right to Economic Development105
Claims of the existence in international law of the right to development are 
commonplace.  However,  the  “sources”  of  this  right  show who its  chief 
protagonists  are,  and  by  their  ambivalence,  silence  or  opposition  to  it, 
whom its adversaries are. Orford106 observes cunning by developing States 
which  involves  attempts  to  invoke  the  right  to  development  against 
accusations of repressive government and a reckless abdication by develop 
States of their influence in the development of its content and procedural 
properties. She writes that:
The right to development has become something of a mantra for States 
seeking to justify the privileging of economic development over human 
rights and to legitimise repressive or authoritarian policies. The right is 
equally systematically resisted by industrialised States seeking to ensure 
that their corporations and investors are not constrained in their operations 
in the South
This suggests a polarisation of opinion with developing countries arraigned 
in support of it and most developed countries united in their opposition to it 
has marked out an intellectual site of contestation over the presumed right. 
The answer to this problem according to Orford does not lie in walking 
away from the debate about how to move the right forward because that 
would leave interpretation and application of the said right to the very same 
people that cunningly want to use it to legitimise their brutal and repressive 
regimes.
Earliest recognition of the said right occurs in resolutions of the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights (the Commission).  Given 
that resolutions of UN organs except those of the Security Council have no 
legal  effect  in  international  law, this  perhaps shows to  the weakness of 
claims  to  the  existence  of  this  right.   In  Resolution  4  (XXXIII)  of  21 
February  1977  the  Commission,  which  examined  among  other  things 
impediments  to  the  realisation  of  economic,  social  and  cultural  rights 
particularly  in  developing  countries  declared  that  there  was  a  right  to 
105 For a thorough discussion of its underpinnings, proposed remit and difficulties 
with, see especially Orford, A. (1999)”Globalisation and the Right to 
Development”, in Alston, P. ed. Peoples’ Rights, Oxford University Press, pp.127-
84.
106 Ibid at 133.
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economic development. Four years later, in Resolution 36 (XXXVII) of 11 
March  1981  a  Working  Group  of  Government  Experts  on  the  right  to 
development was established. In Resolution 1989/45 of 6 March 1989 the 
Commission  requested  the  UN  Secretary-General  to  facilitate  a  global 
consultation process regarding the realisation of the right to development as 
a human right. A global consultation meeting was held in Geneva from 8 to 
12 January 1990 that examined the right to development as a human right. 
The meeting “reaffirmed that the right of individuals, and groups to take 
decisions collectively, to choose their own representative organizations and 
to  have  freedom  of  democratic  action,  free  from  interference  was 
fundamental to democratic participation” and emphasised that participation 
was  crucial  to  the  realisation  of  the  right  to  development.107 More 
importantly, the meeting linked the right to development with social justice. 
It  lambasted  development  strategies  oriented  only  towards  economic 
growth and financial for failing to a large extent to achieve social justice 
and  exalted  the  UN  to  take  the  lead  in  promoting  the  right  to 
development.108 The UN Declaration on the Right to Development109 of 4 
December 1986 brought to the top of the UN agenda, developing countries’ 
concerns  about  development  and  world  order.  In  1993,  the  World 
Conference on Human Rights described the right to development as both 
universal  and  inalienable  and  also  integral  to  the  fundamental  human 
rights.110 It  is  now  regularly  reaffirmed  in  resolutions  of  both  the  UN 
General Assembly and of the Commission on Human Rights. Article 22 of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights111 imposes on States the 
duty,  individually  or  collectively  to  ensure  the  exercise  of  the  right  to 
development. In spite of their verbal enthusiasm for development, except 
for a few, the majority of African States are lumped at the bottom end of 
the  hierarchy  of  developed  States  and  again  for  a  few,  top  the  list  of 
repressive  regimes  in  the  world.  Their  leaders  by  and  large  use  public 
office following the example demonstrated by their colonial masters - to 
create an elite upper class that oppresses the majority. 
Development implies change. If that change results in regression of 
social  conditions,  it  may be  difficult  to  justify.  Desirable  change  seeks 
always to build on present gains rather than to multiply the social minuses. 
Since the  collapse  in  1999 of  the  land reform pact  between the  United 
107 Ibid. at 131.
108 Ibid. at 132.
109 UN Doc. A/41/53 (1987)
110 See Article 10 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), 32 
I.L.M. 1661.  
111 21 I.L.M.59.
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Kingdom and the Zimbabwe Government for instance112 and the beginning 
of violence against commercial farmers in the name of land redistribution, 
Zimbabwe has consistently topped the list of “fastest shrinking economy in 
the world” in spite of occurrence in other parts of the world in the same 
period  of  financial  disasters,  natural  disasters  and  complex  financial 
scandals that rocked investor confidence. These include the collapse of the 
Argentine economy in 2001, scandals in the United States involving major 
companies  in  2002,  terrible  and  economically  crippling  wars  in  the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. One report suggests that 
since 1999, the Zimbabwe national economy has contracted by as much as 
15%, inflation has vaulted above 50%, and direct foreign investment has all 
but evaporated.113 This suggests a real deficit in Zimbabwe’s developmental 
strategy to weed out past and continuing injustices directly connected to her 
colonial  experience  because  this  strategy  has  eaten  up  all  her  political, 
social and economic gains since independence from the UK in 1980. A 
former model for race relations in the world, Zimbabwe has now become a 
pariah  State  whose  leadership  is  not  welcome anywhere  outside  Africa 
because their policies promote abuse of human rights.   
4.3.3 Land Use
I noted in chapter one that land’s elemental qualities are beyond dispute. 
These qualities are helped on by the fact that man has not yet mastered the 
divine  art  of  creating  land,  and  also  by  land’s  qualities  of  utility  and 
indestructibility, which distinguish it from other, more perishable forms of 
property. For all societies these qualities make land commerce’s engine. 
Even virtual companies require a physical desk-space, a chair and at least 
one  computer  from  which  to  indulge  their  fancy,  not  to  mention 
multinational  companies whose involvement with any country is  usually 
heralded  by  purchase  of  vast  acres  of  land  on  which  to  conduct  their 
businesses.  The  housing  market,  in  spite  of  its  turbulence,  is  generally 
regarded to be among the “safest” investments for retirement plans, capital 
investment,  etc.  For agrarian communities economic success has always 
thrived on  the  cooperation  between commercial  banks  and private  title-
holders to land who have used their land as security for the financing of 
developmental projects ranging from chicken, pig, cattle, and sheep rearing 
112 See Chapter 1.
113 See “Zimbabwe economy” at 
http://www.geographyiq.com/countries/zi/Zimbabwe_economy_summary.htm 
(viewed on 04/04/03)
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to the rearing of more exotic species such as crocodile, ostrich and other 
game animals.  Tourist  resorts  and  lodges  financed  by  loans  secured on 
private  land  titles  abound.  Associated  with this  has  been  the  growth  in 
insurance  finance  services,  transport  service,  catering  services, 
entertainment industry and training of personnel  involved with all  these 
sectors.  The  raising  of  tea,  tobacco,  citrus,  sugar  and  other  plantations 
depended  very  much  on  the  cooperation  of  banks  that  were  ready  and 
willing to finance those projects on loans secured on the private land-titles 
of the borrowers. Through this cooperation between banks and commercial 
farmers  the  potential  for  land  use  has  been  released  and  countries  like 
Zimbabwe became known as “the bread basket of Africa”, exporting all 
over the world, corned beef, yoghurt, butter, all forms of milk, sugar, corn, 
citrus  fruit,  rose  flowers,  ostrich meet,  etc.  Therefore,  the  possibility  of 
persons who hold  land to  use  that  land as  security  for  bank loans  that 
finance  projects  targeted at  exploiting  the  economic potential  of  SADC 
economies should form a necessary part of the equation to resolution of the 
land  crisis  in  the  region.  The  possibility  of  drawing  bank  loans  for 
economic development and economic regeneration programmes is arguably 
the strongest quality of land as property because even with the most fertile 
square mile of it on earth, without the resources to exploit it to its fullest 
potential, the title holder remains impoverished, even tormented. Unless the 
titles  that  result  from  dissolution  of  private  individual  land-titles  are 
equipped to sustain the cooperation between landowners and banks that has 
served to spark off  several  other related service industries  that  combine 
with the agriculture industry to inspire economic success of the region, the 
SADC’s land reform programme is doomed to fail. So what should the new 
land titles that are for the most part replacing the private individual land 
titles contain in order to sustain the cooperation of commercial banks? 
If the current land reform programmes in the SADC are going to 
compliment  economic  growth  and  prosperity,  a  minimal  form  of  land 
registration will  need to occur of  every plot of  land held in trust under 
humwe. Given that the landless peasants for whom commercial farms have 
been appropriated have not the financial means to purchase land, and are 
merely receiving some, communal trusteeship titles should be created for 
their lifetime, with the option to develop it into a private individual title by 
purchasing the former title from their community. The ultimate goal would 
be twofold. The first, would be the eventual conversion of all communal 
trusteeship titles  into private individual  titles because that  would be the 
only incentive through which holders would be encouraged to undertake 
meaningful land development programmes and projects that lasted beyond 
their  own life  expectancy  because  inheritance  rules  would  not  apply  to 
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communal  trusteeship  titles.  Inheritance  of  communal  trusteeship  titles 
would  violate  the  equal  opportunity  principle  according  to  which  all 
members of the community of ripe age had equal access to an equal portion 
of land to live off. Besides, passing on to an heir that which is communally 
owned confuses private and public property. Also, the community would 
forfeit without any benefit accruing thereto, its right to assign and re-assign 
land that  belongs to it  on a first  come first  served basis.  The idea of  a 
“redress fund” would appear to address the conflict between leasing land 
for life and the need by trusteeship owners to develop that land in order to 
derive  from it  maximum benefit.  A person that  invested for  argument’s 
sake the equivalent of half a million pounds sterling into a piece of land 
would wish to exploit his investment beyond his own life and that of his 
grand-children. The second would be establishment of  a “redress fund”. 
The  money  derived  from  converting  a  plot  of  land  from  communal 
trusteeship title to private individual title would go into a “redress fund” 
from which community members could derive some form of benefit  for 
having forfeited land to the emergent landowners. That benefit could take 
several forms. For instance, it could create an investment fund from which 
any  member  of  the  community  who  had  a  project  that  the  community 
regarded as beneficial to its interests could borrow a loan. Projects funded 
through such schemes would eventually enable those still  on communal 
trusteeship titles to convert to private individual title, enriching further the 
redress fund which eventually would become so big that with the end of 
communal trusteeship title, a fund would have been established that could 
fund a wide range of investment projects that the community approved of. 
It would provide opportunity for people to explore their agricultural talents 
and  open  up  very  healthy  competition  in  the  community,  as  everyone 
would have only themselves to blame for their lot and not the government, 
a former colonial master,  the World Bank, or any other scapegoat.  That 
would in turn create a new class of entrepreneurs in the community, who 
also  enriched  the  “redress  fund”.  With  another  layer  of  post-emergent 
entrepreneur industrialists would come a new category of economists and 
service providers.  This form of social engineering would still be premised 
on  humwe.  The  humwe social engineering paradigm would maintain and 
maximise  the  nexus  between economic development  and  private  capital 
funding very much needed in these agrarian communities.  Humwe’s land 
redistribution  agenda  so  pursued  would  become  the  bedrock  of  SADC 
States economic reform and industrial development. It would reduce and 
even  perhaps  annihilate  the  hitherto  stifling  dependence  of  SADC 
economies  on  the  Bretton  Woods  financial  institutions  and  empower 
psychologically, generations of native Africans with self-belief. It would 
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extinguish the expectation among citizens that solutions to their problems 
lay beyond themselves, in the custody of some generous donor from the 
Western world. It would create local wealth those of the empowered local 
people and offer lasting opportunities that could not be compared with the 
transient foreign investors which fold up and fly away at the slightest hint 
of  an  economic  sneeze.  Of  course  the  success  of  the  humwe social 
engineering paradigm would depend in large measure on the ability of its 
operatives to efficiently managing the “redress fund”. In a region where 
corruption  and  nepotism  are  devils  that  people  appear  increasingly  to 
accept as unavoidable evils,  humwe’s social engineering project may yet 
succumb to the same vices. SADC States are not peculiarly different from 
other States in this sense, just that others may have already made more 
progress  than  themselves  in  fighting  these  evils.  The  US  has  adopted 
legislation (the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act114 (FCPA)) prohibiting, and 
indeed criminalizing bribes made by national businesses to foreign officials 
in order to obtain business.  The FCPA grew out  of  abuses primarily of 
government contractors which came to light in the early to mid 1970s, in 
which  bribes  were  used  to  obtain  business  in  both  developed  and 
developing countries.  In the United Kingdom, the doctrine of  individual 
and  collective  ministerial  responsibility  applies  to  make  Ministers 
accountable  or  answerable  to  Parliament.115 This  doctrine  is  arguably 
foremost  in  the  tools  of  the  British  constitution  intended to  protect  the 
integrity of government and public faith in the system. That corruption is a 
worldwide problem is evidenced also by adoption on 16 December 1996 by 
the  General  Assembly of  the  United Nations  of  the  Declaration against 
Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions.116 The 
General Assembly is the main deliberative organ of the United Nations and 
comprises of representatives of all Member States, each having only one 
vote.  This paved the way for adoption approximately a year later by the 29 
member  States  of  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (OECD),  of  the  Convention  on  Combating  Bribery  of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.117  Wilder 
and Ahrens118 write that the true cost of corruption worldwide is unknown, 
but it certainly runs into billions of dollars. Bribery tends to:
114 Pub L No 95-213, 91 Stat 1494 (1997)
115 See McEldowney, J.F. (2nd edn 1998) Public Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
pp.95-103.
116 GA Res 51/191 (86th ple. Mtg), UN Doc A/Res51/191 (1996).
117 OECD Doc DAFFE/EME/MR(97) 20.
118 Wilder, M. and Ahrens, M. (2001) “Australia’s Implementation of the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions”, 
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1) Distort grossly the tendering for public contracts, resulting in over-
cost projects and shoddy work
2) Distort prioritisation of projects, often resulting in “white elephant” 
investment projects
3) Divert money from public accounts to private individuals and often 
into foreign bank accounts
4) Undermine equity, efficiency and integrity in the public service
5) Burden business with an extra layer of costs which increases the 
level  of  uncertainty  in  doing  business  in  countries  with  high 
corruption.
However, if these and other related evils can be mustered, the humwe social 
engineering paradigm offers what is perhaps and arguably the best hope of 
equitably  redistributing  economic  advantages  in  the  SADC,  and  of 
liberating  the  SADC  economy  from  the  Bretton  Woods  financial 
institutions  –  itself  a  proven  critical  step  to  real  and  lasting  economic 
development.
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Table 4.1 Humwe Social Engineering Paradigm
                   
  
4.4. Humwe and Globalisation
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Phase 1 Humwe sponsored 
communal trusteeship land titles 
(lease for life)
Phase 2
Incremental conversion to private 
individual permanent titles and 
creation of “redress fund” and 
emergent landowners
Phase 3
Emergence of entrepreneurs backed 
by “redress fund” development fund
Phase 4
Emergence of “redress fund” backed 
industrialists
Etc, etc.
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Literature on the subject confirms positions119 that affirm “globalisation” 
and others that contest trade liberalisation in the strongest terms. One view 
is that we already live in an increasingly integrating order where social and 
economic processes operate predominantly at a global level. According to 
this view, national and political communities are inevitably decision takers. 
Another view is that the quality and reach of States’ sovereign independent 
status  is  now  far  more  robust  than  ever.  According  to  this  view, 
unprecedented international  economic interaction has been facilitated by 
States themselves which retain control over it with an impressive range of 
political options that they continue to fashion and strengthen. Held120 rejects 
both  of  these  positions  because  they  ask  the  wrong  question,  i.e.  has 
globalisation occurred or not, and what are the consequences if it has? That 
approach is limited partly because it perceives globalisation as a one off 
event  that  becomes a reality at a  definite point  rather than a continuing 
process  that  is  facilitated  by  processes  of  globalisation.  He  dismisses 
conceptions of globalisation that are not sensitive to the historical variation 
in  forms  of  globalisation  and  their  variable  impact  on  politics.  The 
economic integration that we call globalisation is only the latest example of 
what has been happening for ages. Calitz121 writes that modern economic 
globalisation is the latest manifestation of an erratic pattern of economic 
integration  which  has  occurred  in  leaps  and  bounds  over  the  years.  In 
Roman times, monetary integration was far more advanced than in modern 
Europe, when the dinarius was used as a currency in an area, which today 
covers parts of more than 40 countries in Europe, North Africa and Asia. 
More recently, (1870 – 1930), the pound sterling was the currency of a part 
of the world which today represents more than 50 countries, including India 
which has a population of one billion – almost one quarter of the world 
population.  The  difference  between modern  day  economic  globalisation 
and previous versions of it is that:
1) it  appears  not  to  be driven by an imperial  power though the role  and 
function  of  the  United  Nations’  financial  institutions  including  the 
119 For a succinct summary, see Held, D. (1998) “Democracy and Globalisation” in 
Archibugi et al. Re-imagining Political Community, Polity Press, Cambridge, 
pp.11-27.
120 Ibid, p.13.
121 Calitz, E. (2000) “Fiscal Implications of the Economic Globalisation of South 
Africa”, The South African Journal of Economics, Vol.68 No.4 p.564 at p.565. 
Discussing the potential effect on the SADC of the new WTO trade liberalisation 
regime, see Chigara, B. (2001-2002) “Trade Liberalisation: Saviour or Scourge  of 
SADC Economies”, The University of Miami International and Comparative Law 
Review, vol. 10 Special Issue, pp.7-21.  
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International  Monetary  Fund(IMF)  and  the  World  Bank  is  difficult  to 
exonerate from imperial force machinations,
2) it  does not  require a  military offensive aimed at  a stable expansion of 
territory,
3) “the major agent of economic integration is a spectacular drop in the cost 
of communications and information …. Global communication at falling 
cost presents competition to governments because it influences the views 
and behaviour  of  residents and reduces  the  scope for  authoritarianism, 
paternalism and government without accountability”,122
4) it occurs at an unparalleled scale, attracting participation of State entities, 
multinational companies, financial institutions, residents and foreigners of 
States, international mobility of capital, technology and sometimes labour,
5) it produces devastating effects, winners and losers, affluence and abject 
poverty,
6) it compounds labour migration, in that an estimated 120 million people 
find themselves outside their countries of birth, a high proportion even if 
we discount political refugees,
7) it is perceived by many to be irreversible.123
But even if we attributed globalisation to a set of forces that exclusively or 
mutually facilitated it, we would still need to identify those processes that 
catalyse, expedite or result in it in order to better understand it and also to 
assess its potential or real impact on humwe inspired projects. According to 
Held124 globalisation is a spatial phenomenon that lies on a continuum with 
“the  local”  at  one  end  and  “the  global”  at  the  other.   Firstly,  this 
disassociation  of  the  local  from  the  global  is  problematic  because  the 
exclusiveness that it suggests is almost entirely impossible in today’s world 
as the local is at once the global. Secondly, globalisation suggests many 
chains  of  political,  economic  and  social  activity  that  are  becoming 
interregional or intercontinental in scope.
[It] suggests that there has been an intensification of levels of interaction 
and interconnectedness within and between States and societies. What is 
noteworthy about  the modern global  system is  the stretching of  social 
relations  in  and  through  new  dimensions  of  activity  and  the  chronic 
intensification  of  patterns  of  interconnectedness  mediated  by  such 
phenomena  as  modern  communication  networks  and  new  information 
technology.  It  is  possible  to  distinguish  different  historical  forms  of 
globalisation in terms of 1) the extensiveness of networks of relations and 
122 Ibid. p.566.
123 Ibid. p.568.
124 Held, D. (1998) “Democracy and Globalisation” in Archibugi et al. Re-
imagining Political Community, Polity Press, Cambridge, p.13.
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connections; 2) the intensity of flows and levels of enmeshment within the 
networks;  and  3)  the  impact  of  these  phenomena  on  particular 
communities. … [It] is neither a singular condition nor a linear process. 
… [It] is best thought of as a multidimensional phenomenon involving 
diverse  domains  of  activity  and  interaction,  including  the  economic, 
political, technological, military, legal, cultural and environmental.
Globalisation so understood necessarily imposes on national, regional and 
inter-regional  policy  decisions  requirements  that  are,  ignored  at  the 
particular  risk  of  economic,  social  and  political  failure.  Arguably,  the 
political force of globalisation is the one factor that every nation must first 
consider  before  adopting  any  economic  stance.  In  particular,  it  is  the 
political  force  of  globalisation  that  dominates  the  social  construction  of 
humwe, and with it, its prospects of success or failure – literally meaning 
poverty or provision in the SADC. Thus, transfer of commercial farms to 
peasants who have neither the capital nor expertise to produce the wheat, 
tobacco, nuts, sunflower and other products at the volume that commercial 
farmers had habitually produced has been regarded by many as economic 
suicide in both the short and long terms.  This suicidal image of humwe has 
in general fed Western criticism of the humwe project. However, Southern 
States have generally accepted humwe as a necessary outgrowth of colonial 
injustices. To this extent the political force of globalisation masters humwe 
in that it creates the social imprimatur of the latter, thereby determining its 
social  force.  In  economic  terms  social  force  often  equals  economic 
persuasion. States with low social force command very little or no respect 
among foreign investors. For example, at the peak of the United Nations’ 
long battle against apartheid in South Africa, few foreign investors wished 
to be associated with South African business. Few international companies 
openly admitted to trading directly with South Africa, or wanting to invest 
in  that  country  while  apartheid  continued.  The  political  force  of 
globalisation  reigned  in  on  the  South  African  government’s  choice  to 
pursue apartheid.  The long-term result  was that  economic  forces  of  the 
world were adjusted to repel South African business interest. This contrasts 
sharply with popular appeal in the West  to South African produce after 
1994.125  Globalisation’s political forces thus shaped the international social 
imprimatur of South Africa’s economic potential. This resulted in a South 
Africa with a far inferior economic, social and political ranking than her 
125 Discussing the European Union’s special trade agreement with South Africa 
even to the detriment of the Southern Africa Development Community, see 
Chigara, B. (2001-2002) “Trade Liberalisation: Saviour or scourge of SADC 
Economies”, University of Miami International & Comparative Law Review, vol 
10 pp.7-21.
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potential  suggested.  For  this  reason  it  would  benefit  humwe engineered 
projects that seek to undo social injustices that are rooted in colonial or 
some such other similar historical experience of a State to seek to carry 
with them the political forces of globalisation. If this is correct, then from 
the  offset  globalisation  imposes  its  own  pre-requisites  on  the  SADC’s 
humwe inspired land reform project that can not be ignored or side-stepped 
if political, economic and social prosperity of the region is to be maintained 
or developed further. But what are these pre-requisites, and how may their 
inclusion  affect  the  humwe paradigm  discussed  above?  Who  and  what 
should determine both their form and their content?
4.5. Globalisation and land reform programs
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Increasingly, market forces are becoming the cardinal focus of national and 
regional  economic management.  Surrender  to  market  forces  is  routinely 
urged by international financial institutions and by donor countries to target 
States. Armatya Sen, urging intellectual engagement rather than surrender 
to markets and their appeal, lure, force, and virtues writes that “The virtues 
of the market mechanism are now standardly assumed to be so pervasive 
that qualifications seem unimportant. Any pointer to defects of the market 
mechanism appears to be, in the present mood, strangely old fashioned and 
contrary to contemporary culture”.126 Generally speaking, market efficiency 
is  what  States  are  fighting  to  achieve  in  order  to  secure  the  nod  of 
transnational  corporations  (TNCs)  that  now  dominate  international 
commerce and trade ahead of their competitors. State practice shows that in 
order to both enhance their competitiveness and to secure markets for their 
goods in a world where competition is  forever growing more and more 
fierce, States with similar economic standards or aspirations are ganging up 
to form economic unions. Examples include the European Union, the North 
Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Commonwealth States (CS), 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Oil and Petroleum 
Producing Countries (OPAC), Southern African Development Community 
(SADC),  Economic Community  of  Western  African  States  (ECOWAS), 
Preferential Trade Area for East and Southern Africa and the Preferential 
Trade  Area  for  East  and  Southern  Africa  (PTA).  States  that  are  not 
enthusiastic  about  market  efficiency  risk  economic  decline,  failure  or 
suicide while those that embrace it stand a much better chance compared to 
their competitors of enhancing economies. A few more employed citizens 
often translate into a few more votes at the next parliamentary election for 
the government of the day while a few more unemployed citizens often 
translate into disfavour with the electorate at the next election. Barring a 
bizarre freak election result, a ticking economy arguably always is a vote 
winner.  Little  wonder  then  that  States  appear  to  be  in  competition  to 
prostitute themselves to TNCs. In particular, developing countries that are 
perhaps least suited to open up their economies so that local producers can 
compete with external producers appear confused about how to deal with 
the situation. On the one hand, international financial institutions on whom 
they  depend  for  economic  loans  often  make  it  a  condition  of  their 
assistance that they liberalise their markets, i.e. remove all trade barriers 
that protected native business interests and ensure equal treatment in the 
market place of external products and service providers. The World Trade 
Oranisation’s  (WTO) cardinal  policies  of  Most  favoured  Nation (MFN) 
Treatment and Nationality Principle (NP) are designed to ensure this result 
126 Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press, p.111.
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among States Parties.127 With nowhere else to turn to for these much needed 
loans, developing countries always end up accepting any, and all conditions 
– making for one-sided contractual agreements where the lender imposes 
his will over the borrower. But as Ghandi reminded his people at various 
points in the struggle for independence from colonial rule, there is dignity 
without measure in the wearing of a piece of self-spun cloth, no matter how 
inferior  it  may appear  in  comparison to  a  foreign-spun one that  causes 
widespread  poverty,  pain  and  despair  in  the  land.  Risking  long-term 
establishment of locally based entrepreneurship for short-term immediate 
hedonist gratification is never in the long-term interest of the hedonist. But 
the choice for developing countries is not merely one between protection of 
home-grown economies on the one hand, and opening-up of their markets 
to  foreign competition under  the  banner of  “trade liberalisation” on the 
other. The success or failure of any business idea depends not just upon its 
intention, but also on the availability of all the resources required to set it in 
motion, particularly finances. Margaret Thatcher once remarked that “No-
one would have remembered the Good Samaritan if he had had only good 
intentions. He had money as well!”  Most developing countries have a fair 
share of  natural  and human resources.  However,  most  of  them lack the 
liquid  flow  of  cash   -  the  missing  link  -  required  to  harness  natural 
resources,  human  resources  and  business  intention  to  pursue  a  viable 
commercial  project.  In  search  of  this  link  developing  countries  submit 
themselves  to  the  requirements  of  anyone  that  will  relieve  them  of 
pressures of all sorts. The main one is electoral de-selection. Just like their 
developed counterparts in developed States, citizens of developing States 
have discovered and are utilising their power to make governments work 
for them by threatening them with electoral deselection. Most governments 
now live under the constant fear of the wrath of a disgruntled electorate, 
except in failed and failing States that are averse to any form of democratic 
governance.  This  has  its  problems.  It  has  the  potential  to  pressure 
governments  into  using  short-term  fixes  that  serve  only  to  worsen  the 
country’s  economic  fortunes.   For  instance,  no  longer  able  to  pay  for 
Zimbabwe’s  petroleum  needs,  President  Mugabe  is  reported  to  have 
“mortgaged”  to  the  Libyan  leader  vast  acres  of  Zimbabwe’s  prime-
agricultural  land  in  exchange  for  petroleum oil.  While  this  might  have 
quelled street  riots  and protests  against his government for only a short 
while, it was only a quick fix that has not sufficiently addressed the general 
economic  collapse  of  the  Zimbabwean  economy.  Zimbabwe  needs  to 
127 Discussing the WTO’s general agreement on trade in services see Arup, C 
(2000) The New World Trade Organization Agreements, Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 95-143.
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rehabilitate its economy into the world economy rather than alienate itself 
through activities that globalisation’s political force ascribes the stigma of 
unacceptability.  That  only  courts  economic  disfavour  of  other  States, 
regional groups and in the end, the collapse of the target State. What this 
suggests is that both unequal land distribution and humwe sponsored land 
grab policies are inimical to SADC States in a globalising world where the 
political force of globalisation, like a guardian angel of universal standards 
of  “fairplay” ruthlessly operates instantly to penalise any threat to those 
universal standards. States that prefer to take their time to learn this lesson 
risk  making  unnecessary  mistakes  with  grave  consequences  for  their 
citizens, particularly where human rights and humanitarian law are at issue. 
But  what  are these standards  of  fairplay  according to  which the SADC 
should stick in  its  effort  to  undo past  and continuing injustices in  their 
communities  that  are  traceable  only  to  colonial  experience  of  their 
territories?
4.5.1. Fairnes, Humwe and Neutrality
Koskenniemi128 writes  that  every  important  social  conflict  demonstrates 
dual claims for the honouring of rights. I would say that complex social 
conflict situations, like the land issue in the SADC, manifest often multi-
faceted  claims  for  the  honouring  of  rights.129 Our  familiarity  with  legal 
systems that seek to declare out rightly a winner and a loser in each contest 
before  a  hearing  has  numbed  our  sensitivity  to  the  full  extent  that  we 
respect the rights that arise from social conflicts. Consequently, we narrow 
our  determination  of  the  rights  to  be  prioritised  to  either  “A”  or  “B”. 
Dispute resolutions arrived at in this way are potentially violent in that they 
fail  to acknowledge also those claims that fail to make the general dual 
category of “A” and “B”. This failure itself:
1) leaves the dispute only partially resolved, and
2) festers  more  social  conflicts  until  the  previously 
neglected interests are finally addressed and resolved. 
3) confirms what Bevan130 calls the schizophrenia of our 
age, by which he means that as more and more people 
128 “The effect of rights on political culture”, in Alston, et.al. eds. (1999) The EU 
and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, p.99 at p.107
129 The contest for the label of “ultimate victim” in the land issue is discussed in 
detail in the previous chapter.
130 Bevan, A.H. (1992) Alternative Dispute Resolution, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
p.v
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are aware of their rights, and as those rights become 
more numerous,  fewer and fewer people  are  able  to 
enforce them particularly because even when litigation 
results in a just decision, “ it  rarely if  ever provides 
complete recompense for the victorious party, and all 
too  often  the  protagonists  feel  that  they  have  been 
completely  abandoned  in  a  sea  of  incomprehensible 
legal,  tactical  and  procedural  complexities,  in  which 
their  despairing  cries  are  drowned,  even  if  they  are 
heard”. 
From this observation is gained the view that resolution of complex social 
conflicts such as the land issue that is rooted in colonial or some such other 
similar  experience  of  States  requires  a  fine  combing  that  does  not 
necessarily  seek  to  prioritise  one set  of  rights  over  another  –  usually  a 
reversal of fortunes among the parties – but to reconcile them so that the 
rights claims of all concerned are acknowledged. Acknowledgment of the 
rights  claims  of  all  stakeholders  is  in  itself  both  a  recognition  and  a 
declaration of the inherent worth of each of the parties involved. Of the 
dispute  resolution  strategies  in  operation  in  most  legal  cultures,131 
alternative  dispute  resolution  (ADR)  strategies  appear  more  suited  than 
others to the model being contemplated here because of its determination to 
attend  issues  between  the  parties  which  often  fail  to  make  the  dualist 
category of “A” and “B”. Crowter132 defines ADR as a process where by 
agreement, parties to a dispute submit their differences to the consideration 
and decision of one or more independent persons of their own choosing. 
“Arbitration has the  force  of  law and generally an arbitrator’s decision, 
called an award, can be enforced in the courts just as a judgment of the 
Court.”133 It is inherently a private procedure where only the parties to the 
arbitration agreement and their representatives can attend any arbitration 
hearing  or  meeting.  The  press  and  the  public  are  excluded.  Thus,  the 
pressure not to lose or, to insist on full justification is reduced and people 
can  weigh  more  realistically  one  another’s  positions  against  theirs  and 
accede more easily  to compromise,  which they would not  otherwise do 
under  intense  publicity  of  the  media.  Lauded  by  its  proponents134 for 
131 Arbitration Act 1996(Commencement No.1) Order (S.I. 1996 No.3146 c.96) 
(United Kingdom)
132 Crowter, H. (1998) Introduction to Arbitration, LLP, London, p.1.
133 Ibid.
134 See for example Sutton et al. (1997) Russell on
  Arbitration, Sweet and Maxwell, London; Newman, P. (1999) Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, CLT Professional Publishing; Crowter, H. (1998) Introduction 
Humwe, Human Rights and Globalisation
offering  affordable,  speedy,  simple  resolutions  where  all  the  major 
stakeholders play a major part in the resolution of the problem and above 
all, the satisfaction that each of the parties has had their day in court, ADR 
contrasts  sharply  with  civil  litigation  which  is  costly,  time  consuming, 
worrying and extended. In civil litigation parties often feel that they have 
surrendered  ownership  of  their  dispute  to  lawyers  that  are  equipped 
confidently to walk the threatening corridors of unfamiliar architecture that 
makes up court buildings, and skilfully to convert their dispute into the 
language of the Court and to decipher into common language, the Court’s 
discourse on their dispute. However, social injustices, the types of which 
are under consideration here are by their nature property of all sections of 
their societies and everyone in the particular society has an inherent interest 
in their resolution. Therefore, they already are in the public domain. They 
defy the element of privacy said to facilitate and catalyse the “compromise” 
that facilitates agreement among stakeholders through ADR. The struggle 
for the label of “ultimate victim” in the status quo or threatened change 
among stakeholders demonstrates the public nature of conflicts that depict 
social justice issues. This makes ADR ill-suited for these kinds of disputes. 
Nonetheless, its spirit of seeking to attend and reconcile both the dominant 
and the lesser interests remains relevant if not instructive to resolution of 
social justice issues particularly because of its pursuit of compromise that 
results in the recognition and justification of the rights of all concerned. In 
this way it acknowledges and reinforces the inherent dignity of all rights 
claimants.  That  achievement  placates  substantially  problems  consequent 
upon resolutions based on the dualist categorisation of conflicts that ignore 
claims of parties that  fail  to make the general  category of “A” or “B”. 
Failure to placate such problems can fester perpetually other undesirable 
problems that are not conducive to peace and security of the State. Often it 
is  the  majority  that  make  rights  claims  against  a  minority  that  holds 
privileges against the majority created by a previous social order. Often the 
minority are reluctant to honour these rights claims in full because to do so 
would, in their view undermine their own rights claims. This typifies rights 
claims as a conflict between  right-as-freedom and right-to-security. In this 
dichotomy, if the State’s authority to intervene to prevent landlessness is 
conceptualised in terms of a right to land, then the landless peasants’ right 
to  land  is  privileged  over  the  commercial  farmers’  right  to  security  of 
property. According to Koskenniemi,135 rights talk alone is not adequate in 
these kinds of situations to resolve the conflicting interests of disputants 
to Arbitration, LLP, London.
135 “The effect of rights on political culture”, in Alston, et.al. eds. (1999) The EU 
and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, p.99 at p.107-8.
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because: 
The  boundaries  of  freedom  and  security  cannot  be  drawn  from  any 
intrinsic or essential meaning of the relevant rights. On the contrary, the 
debate over where such boundaries should lie reflects back on culturally 
conditioned ways of thinking… 
Justification for the imposition of constraint in a morally agnostic society 
may often seem to lie in the need to limit freedom by the freedoms of 
others. If your use of freedom creates harm for me, such use is prohibited. 
[However]  the formal principle of preventing “harm to others” merely 
shifts  focus to  the  concept  of  harm and fails  to  indicate  which of  the 
competing conceptions of harm should be preferred.
The object of land distribution in the SADC is not merely to achieve equal 
access to land but to dethrone the cycle of poverty perpetuated by previous 
property arrangements that created the land issue. The right of anyone to 
buy land and to hold it in any quantity exercised by the commercial farmers 
who now claim against SADC governments the right to security of their 
property, ignores the harm inflicted on the majority in the enjoyment of that 
right.  Enjoyment  of  that  right  resulted  in  a  minute  elite  that  ended  up 
owning the best land in the region, which also has the most potential for 
agricultural  production.  The  magnitude  of  that  harm  shows  in  that 
commercial farmers are the dominant force in the agrarian economies of 
member States of the SADC. They also produce the staple food crops that 
peasant farmers could produce for themselves but for their landlessness. 
Thus, the peasant farmer is forced to depend on the commercial farmer for 
work to buy food crops that he could produce for himself. That dependency 
undermines the inherent dignity of the peasant by limiting his chances to 
develop creatively and to interact with his human capacity and potential. 
Culturally, the native people interacted creatively with their environment, 
exploiting its resources as well as developing them and preserving them.136 
Therefore,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  upholding  security  of  land  rights 
against SADC governments serves to uphold and to perpetuate harm of the 
majority  by  a  minority.  But  so  too  would  a  total  reversal  of  fortunes 
between the commercial farmers and the peasants. Only a recognition of 
both their interests will do. Status quo theorists already argue that even the 
slightest adverse alteration in the balance of land distribution in the region 
will affect economic output of the region. That they argue unnecessarily 
would  “harm”  SADC  economies.  But  security  of  an  economy  that 
perpetuates  social  injustices  of  a  discredited  and foregone  era  is  hardly 
something to argue for, particularly as its violence on the majority defies 
136 See chapter 2 fn.18.
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reason  because  of  its  defiance  of  pursuit  of  fairness.  They  argue  also, 
particularly in the case of South Africa that the land which they occupy was 
terra  nullius when  invading  colonialists  first  occupied  it.  Therefore, 
landless peasants cannot now argue that their position is affected by their 
possession of that land. Besides ignoring the fact that persuing the policy of 
equal access to land for all  now would empower the whole nation as it 
tapped into the potential of previously ostracised citizens that are anxious 
to participate in, and to contribute to the economy, this story line appears to 
foreclose the possibility of  dialogue with the  aggrieved landless  who in 
Zimbabwe’s  case  resorted to  violent  overthrow of  several  farmers  from 
their  properties  and  self-enthronement  as  the  new  masters  of  the  land. 
Positioning  theory  has  shown  that  often  conflicts  are  sustained  by  the 
adoption by the hostile  parties of  conflicting story lines,  in the  light  of 
which  incompatible  and  irresolvable  contradictions  in  meanings  have 
become entrenched.  A “position” is understood as a cluster of rights and 
duties with respect to the acts one is enabled to accomplish as an occupant 
of a position.137
Positioning theory offers a way of getting at the underlying presumptions 
that sustain such misunderstandings and the conflicts that stem from them 
[It evaluates whether] … what people are taken to mean by what they say 
and do is partly a matter of what the various people involved in a social 
episode believe that persons of this or that category are entitled to say or 
do. Such entitlements are called “positions”. Children, for instance, are 
usually  not  accorded  the  same  speaking  rights  as  adults.  They  are 
positioned as recipients of disciplinary admonitions rather than as sources 
of them.138
137 Harre, R. and Slocum, N. (2003) “Disputes as Complex Social Events: On the 
use of Positioning Theory”, Common Knowledge, vol.9 No.1 p100 at 105.
138 Ibid at 102.
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With every position goes a story line, a narrative assumed to justify the 
teller. In the 2003 impasse in the Security Council on whether the use of 
force should be authorised in order to compel Iraqi finally to comply with 
the UN’s requirement that it disarms itself of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs), the United States (US) appeared to entrench its arguments for 
war by wrapping itself up in the banner of  “renowned world liberator”. 
From this position, it sought to categorise States that opposed its demand 
for war on Iraqi as ungrateful beneficiaries of its heroic efforts. The US 
referred  in  particular  to  the  human sacrifice  it  paid  in  the  liberation of 
France from the clutches  of  Nazi  Germany,  and Germany itself  from a 
tyrant. But positioning is itself often averse to reason and fairness. Harre 
and Slocum write that while in many cases, people are satisfied with their 
rights,  “in  other  cases,  the  distribution  of  rights  and  duties  can  be 
challenged. The simple protest “It’s not fair!” can frequently be heard as a 
challenge to implicit positioning.”139 The view that because the US has in 
the past sacrificed so much to rid Europe of a tyrant and in the immediate 
aftermath of that process invested financially to rebuild Europe does not 
qualify it to order everyone else to comply with its view on present issues. 
If the Americans were right in 1945, does it mean that they forever will 
always be right? Story lines are intended by their narrators to justify claim 
rights that are declared in retrospect and in anticipation. The danger is that 
often positions that are fanned by these narratives are subjective unilateral 
declarations  of  claim  rights,  which  in  a  conflict  situation  oppose  in 
unflinching  terms,  the  story  line  of  the  other  disputant.  Thus,  they 
potentially can lockout efforts to edit them, which might then bring parties 
to the dispute close enough to make compromises that amicably resolve the 
dispute.  The  difficulty  with  positioning  theory  is  that  it  relies  on 
categorisation  which  itself  reinforces  positions  because  positions  are 
relative  to  one  another.  Taking  on  the  position  of  nurse  may  serve  to 
position someone else as a patient,  whether or not  he or she wants that 
position.  Because positions are clusters of rights, duties and obligations to 
perform specific acts, they create expectations, beliefs and presuppositions. 
Therefore,  in  anticipation of  a  dispute  players  strategically  may start  to 
manoeuvre  for  the  moral  high  ground -  strategic  positioning.  Or  at  the 
outbreak  of  a  dispute,  participants  immediately  begin  the  scramble  to 
occupy the moral high ground – reactive positioning.  This adds onto the 
tensions and number of  conflicts to be resolved because in some cases, 
positioning sets up a complimentary or antagonistic pattern of rights and 
duties.140 If the battle for the moral high ground peaks before resolution is 
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid. at 107
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achieved of the main dispute, depending on the forum of the dispute, the 
decision makers may feel constrained to reach a decision that would not 
oppose the corresponding resolution of the battle for the moral high ground. 
This could not happen for instance in English Courts where judges must 
give reasons in law for the decision that they have reached. Alternatively, 
the forum could choose to balance the outcome by rewarding the disputant 
that has lost in the battle for the moral high ground with some form of 
compensation for their social loss. It is not uncommon for legal decisions to 
appear on the opposite end of society’s moral power. But pursuing this kind 
of balance in the final outcome of disputants’ fortunes, particularly where 
culturally, this is  perceived to be socially desirable.  In sum, positioning 
theory  alerts  us  to  the  difficulties  that  are  set  in  any  effort  to  resolve 
disputes  that  reflect  past  and  continuing  social  injustices  which  are 
traceable to colonial or some such other similar experience of a State. First, 
stakeholders adopt and publicise narratives that are intended to justify the 
positions that they use to create and fight the dispute. These narratives are 
set  within  the  parties’  own  frames  of  reference.  Within  such  reference 
parties  may  be  able  to  present  a  self-consistent  and  valid  argument. 
However,  because  parties’  frames  of  reference  are  different,  neither 
argument  can  as  such  override  the  other.  According  to  Judge 
Fitzmaurice,141 there cannot be a solution to the problem in this kind of 
situation “unless the correct - or rather acceptable - frame of reference can 
first be determined; but since matters of acceptability depend on approach, 
feeling,  attitude,  or  even  policy  rather  than  correct  legal  or  logical 
argument, there is scarcely a solution along these lines either”. Secondly, 
they categorise themselves and others in the conflict in accordance to their 
subjective  position  that  they hope  will  at  the  end  of  the  dispute  reflect 
“objectivity”. This categorisation is inimical to dispute resolution in that it 
ascribes expectations of justification, beliefs of who is  right and who is 
wrong, and more importantly rights and obligations among the disputants 
even about who has the right to set the parameters of the dispute and the 
terms of the dispute etc. Thirdly, positioning encourages appeal to the local 
and  international  audiences  for  the  moral  high  ground,  which  poisons 
opportunities for moving disputants towards compromise. Because social 
justice  disputes  are  complex  social  events  that  embrace  historical, 
economic and political issues, their resolution can be achieved only through 
141 Golder v. United Kingdom, ECHR (1975) ECR 17. Arguing that the question 
whether or not a conflict is seen as a rights problem and what rights may seem 
relevant depends on the language we use to structure the normative field in focus, 
see Koskenniemi, M. (1999) “The Effects of Rights on Culture”, in Alston et al. 
(eds.) The EU and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, p.99 at 106.
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compromise that acknowledges the inherent dignity of all concerned and 
the  need  to  uphold  that  dignity  and  not  to  reject  it  –  something  that 
adoption of unbending positions can not  facilitate.  This balancing effect 
can only occur when parties drop their rigid narratives, come out of their 
strategic  and  reactive  bargaining  positions,  drop  their  right-claims  and 
march to another place. According to Koskenniemi,142 this is a place 
… “beyond” rights, a place that allows the limitation of the scope of the 
claimed  rights  and  their  subordination  to  “some  pattern,”  or  range  of 
patterns, of human character, conduct and interaction in community, and 
the need to  choose such specification of  rights  as tends to  favour that 
pattern, or range of patterns. In other words, we need some conception of 
human good, of individual flourishing, in a form (or range of forms) of 
common life that fosters rather than hinders such flourishing. [According 
to the European Court off Human Rights, this pattern is clear from the 
understanding that] The fundamental rights recognised by the Court are 
not absolute, however, but must be considered in relation to their social 
function. Consequently, restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of 
these rights, in particular in the context of a common organization of the 
market, provided that these restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of 
general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute, with 
regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference 
impairing the very substance of those rights143
From this understanding of the quality of human rights as policies that must 
be  weighed against  other  policies,  and which may be made to  defer  to 
policies of greater weight than themselves, is gained the understanding that 
the policy of holding land inequitably among people that are dependant on 
agricultural  activities  for  their  livelihoods  is  in  itself  an  injustice  that 
threatens the dignity of all concerned. The majority of people in the SADC 
need land to work in exactly the same way that fish need water to survive. 
Therefore, the policy of securing everyone’s access to land appears to be 
more important than that of ensuring the security of land titles procured 
during or through discredited social  arrangements.  But  determination of 
which policy should be privileged over another does not in itself rid the 
State of the duty to act fairly in the application of the preferred policy. The 
requirements of the duty to be fair are generally divided into two general 
principles, the rule against bias and the right to a fair hearing. 
4.5.1.1. The rule against bias
142 Ibid. at 109.
143 See Case5/88, Wauchauf [1989] ECR 2639.
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The rule against bias was restated in the House of Lords by Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in  ex parte  Pinochet  UgarteNo.2.144 The  contention was that 
there was a real danger or reasonable apprehension or suspicion that Lord 
Hoffman,  who had  been  a  member  of  the  majority  3:2  decision  of  the 
House  Lords  that  had  determined  whether  or  Senator  Pinochet  had 
immunity from arrest and extradition proceedings in the United Kingdom 
in respect of acts committed while he was head of State, might have been 
biased because he was a member and chairman of Amnesty International 
Charity  Ltd,  a  body  that  carried  out  Amnesty  International’s  charitable 
purposes. Amnesty International had acted as a third-party intervenor in the 
proceedings. 
… it is alleged that there is an appearance of bias not actual bias. The 
fundamental principle is that a man may not be a judge in his own cause. 
The principle, as developed by the courts, has two very similar but not 
identical implications. First it may be applied literally: if a judge is in fact 
a  party to the litigation or has a  financial  or  proprietary interest in its 
outcome then he is indeed sitting as a judge in his own cause. In that case, 
the  mere  fact  that  he  is  a  party  to  the  action  or  has  a  financial  or 
proprietary  interest  in  its  outcome is  sufficient  to  cause  his  automatic 
disqualification. The second application of the principle is where a judge 
is  not  a  party  to  the  suit  and  does  not  have  a  financial  interest  in  its 
outcome, but in some other way his conduct or behaviour may give rise to 
a suspicion that he is not impartial, for example because of his friendship 
with a party. … this case falls within the first category of case, viz. where 
the judge is disqualified because he is a judge in his own cause. In such a 
case, once it is shown that the judge is himself a party to the cause, or has 
a  relevant interest  in  its  subject  matter,  he  is  disqualified without  any 
investigation into whether there was a likelihood or suspicion of bias.
The requirement to guard against bias sustains the principle of equality of 
arms and is common to all legal systems worthy of that name. The High 
Court of Australia in Webb v The Queen145 held that: 
In considering the merits of the test to be applied in a case where a juror is 
alleged to be biased, it is important to keep in mind that the appearance as 
well as the fact of impartiality is  necessary to retain confidence in the 
administration  of  justice.  Both  the  parties  to  the  case  and  the  general 
public must be satisfied that justice has not only been done but that it has 
been seen to be done. Of the various tests used to determine an allegation 
144 [2001] 1 AC 119, House of Lords.
145 Per Mason C.J. and McHugh J. (1994) 181 C.L.R. 41 at 50-52.
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of  bias,  the  reasonable  apprehension  test  of  bias  is  by  far  the  most 
appropriate  for  protecting  the  appearance  of  impartiality.  The  test  of 
“reasonable likelihood” or “real danger” of bias tends to emphasise the 
court’s view of the facts
Once  reasonable  apprehension  about  the  impartiality  of  social  injustice 
resolution strategies and mechanisms have arisen, the best course of action 
is  to  start  the  whole  thought  process  all  over  again  about  how best  to 
resolve  the  conflict.  Previously,  courts  applied  different  tests  but  the 
reasonable  apprehension  test,  which  emphasises  the  role  of  public 
perception on the dispensation of justice, appears to have taken root as the 
cardinal test for compliance with the requirement of impartiality in most 
common  law  countries.146 In  Reg  v  Gough147 the  House  of  Lords 
specifically  rejected  the  reasonable  suspicion  test and  the  cases  and 
judgments  which had  applied  it  in  favour  of  a  modified version of  the 
reasonable likelihood test. The emergent land reform policies of the SADC 
that are themselves a reaction to a past and continuing social injustice  viz 
access to land on racial lines are in real danger of offending the test of 
impartiality,  and  with  that,  denying  legitimacy  to  those  processes. 
International consequences of that can be dire. In Zimbabwe for instance, 
the cause of the landless has been championed by “war veterans” that have 
appeared  before  the  law  courts,  physically  threatened  judges  that  gave 
decisions  that  went  against  them  on  this  issue,  and  then  removed 
commercial farmers from their premises. This has made them parties to the 
land dispute, and persons with a proprietary interest in the outcome of the 
dispute and finally, judges and administrators of the land dispute. Unbiased 
balancing  of  disputants’  interests  that  is  conducive  to  fairness  in  the 
resolution of opposing claim-rights is eliminated from the whole process 
where it appears that a party to the dispute stands the chance of enjoying 
extra-judicial  advantage  in  the  matter.  So  too  is  compromise  that  is 
necessary  to  move  the  dispute  from  subjective  positions  that  insist  on 
honouring of rights and expectations regardless of the “new” injustices that 
might result. Instead, the strategic narrative of the “war veterans” and the 
position that it entrenches, and the expectations, beliefs and claims that it 
insists on ride rough shod over those of their co-disputants - hardly a means 
of resolving disputes after emergence of the universal human rights culture 
in  the  last  half  century.  Whereas  the  doctrines  of  sovereign  equality  of 
States and non-interference in the internal affairs of States are among the 
fundamental  doctrines  on  which  international  law  has  been  raised,  the 
146 Ibid. para. 70.
147 [1993] AC 646
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human rights movement which evolved much later has now fettered these 
principles by establishing that the way in which a government treats its own 
citizens is now a legitimate matter of international scrutiny on the part of 
governments  and human rights  non-governmental  organizations.148 Thus, 
the legitimacy of strategies and mechanisms (ultimately policies) adopted 
to resolve past and continuing social injustices of any kind must still be 
assessed by requirements of fairness and justiciabilty rendered imperative 
by the human rights movement because it  is also this  culture of  human 
rights that alerts us to the existence of past and continuing social injustices 
in any given situation. Therefore, resort to strategies and mechanisms that 
are inconsistent with the objectives of the human rights movement (HRM) 
is hazardous particularly for three reasons. First, it opts out of the game 
plan of the HRM, which is to expose social injustices in order humanely 
and legally to resolve them and not merely to reverse them and create new 
ones in their stead. The HRM objective in conflict situations is to try and 
achieve  “dignity  equilibrium”.  Secondly,  the  means  to  a  goal  are 
themselves seeds of social engineering, sown in the pursuit of the goal only 
to flourish among us long after we have achieved our goal. Therefore, to 
use rape, murder, plunder, ethnic cleansing and all the other abuses that 
appear  to  have  characterised  land  reform  policy  in  Zimbabwe,  is  to 
surrender Zimbabwe’s social and political fortunes to the same practices 
long after the scourge of unequal access to land has been forgotten about. 
Thirdly,  it  appears  to  be an implicit  admission of failure  at  the  highest 
level, i.e. failure politically to imagine an approach to the problem that is 
consistent  with  twenty-first  century  HRM  morality.  We  give  in  to  the 
basest  of  our  instincts  when  the  lights  of  our  reason  fail.  Under  the 
influence of our basest instincts, we sow in social terms, the seeds of our 
own destruction. The land reform policies emerging in the SADC appear to 
revolt also against the second of the requirements of the legal standard of 
fairness – the right to a fair hearing.
4.5.1.2 .  Audi alteram partem - the right to a fair hearing
148 See also Chigara, B. (2002) Amnesty in International Law: The legality under 
international law of national amnesty laws, Longman, pp.125-62; Wheeler, N.J. 
(2001) “HumanitarianVigilantes or Legal Entrepreneurs: Enforcing Human Rights 
in International Society” in Caney, S. and Jones, P. Human Rights and Global 
Diversity, Frank Cass, Ilford, pp.139-60; Legomsky, H (2001) “The United 
Nations and the Protection of Human Rights”, Washington University Journal of 
Law & Policy, pp.7-15.
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In Ridge v Baldwin, Lord Ridge stated that jurisprudence on dismissal cases 
falls into three categories,149 namely, dismissal of a servant by his master - 
which commercial farmers that have been forcibly moved off their land are 
not;  dismissal  from  an  office  held  during  pleasure  –  and  commercial 
farmers could not be said to have been holding their  farms as a leisure 
activity;  and  dismissal  from a  position  where  there  must  be  something 
against  a  person  to  warrant  their  dismissal  –  which  is  the  position  of 
occupied  by  commercial  farmers  throughout  the  SADC.  Regarding 
property rights,  Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works,150 upheld also in 
Ridge v Baldwin, ruled that where statutory authority is relied upon to evict 
an owner as has happened in Zimbabwe recently, the authority applying 
such authority must show that they had notified the owner of their intention 
to apply the statute against them, and given the owner sufficient time to 
prepare and present their case against such action. In that case, an owner 
brought an action against the board with statutory authority to demolish any 
building erected and to recover the cost from its owner. He argued that the 
board  had  exercised  its  authority  without  giving  him an  opportunity  to 
present his case. In spite of the board’s argument that their discretion to 
order demolition was not a judicial discretion and that any appeal should 
have  been  to  the  Metropolitan  Board  of  Works,  the  court  unanimously 
decided in favour of the owner. This requirement to hear an owner before 
reaching a decision whether or not to exercise statutory discretion against 
them  privileges  negotiation  and  a  balancing  of  interests.  It  rejects 
positioning that rejects all manner of reason. It acknowledges the rights of 
both parties to the situation. Of course, the hope of all negotiation is not 
capitulation of one of the parties to the table and affirmation of the other’s 
position.  Complex  negotiation  often  target  compromise  of  concerned 
parties  in  various  areas  of  the  argument  with  the  hope  of  reaching  an 
acceptable outcome to all the parties. The benefits of realising a satisfactory 
measure  of  fairness  in  resolution  of  past  and  continuing  social  justice 
directly connected to colonial or some such similar experience of the State 
are endless.  They include attributes that developing countries in particular 
would consider extremely invaluable, namely,
1) Promotion of reliance on the law and justice systems which limits 
resort to blood feuds etc. A nation that has lost its reliance on the 
law and legal systems to settle issues is akin to a man that has lost 
his soul. He has no peace, stability or hope.
149 [1964] AC 40, House of Lords
150 (1863) 14 CBNS 180
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2) Inculcation of the rule of law in the fabric of the State system – the 
only reliable means to guarantee human freedoms and inspire hope 
for a free, democratic and stable State.
3) Promotion of human rights and respect for the inherent dignity in 
all persons.
4) Economic,  moral  and  political  support  of  nations  with  similar 
aspirations.
It goes without saying that strategies to resolve past and continuing social 
justice directly connected to colonial or some such similar experience of 
the State that are not guided by the twin tracks of fairness discussed above 
risk plunging the State in the doldrums of doom-and –gloom.
4.5.2.  The requirement of sustainable use of natural resources
The  United  Nations’  policy  on  use  of  natural  resources  is  manifest  in 
declarations of its organs, particularly the General Assembly,151 multilateral 
negotiations  and  agreements  and  actual  practice  of  States.  It  has  as  its 
source, an unlikely dynamic, i.e. decolonization and numerical growth of 
decolonised States to make a majority in the General Assembly.152 This 
majority enabled developing States to elevate economic development issues 
to the very top of the UN’s agenda. In particular, newly independent States 
that joined the UN soon became disillusioned with among other things, the 
Bretton Woods financial  architecture  and its  objectives.  Orford153 writes 
that “Many of those States took longer to join the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and those who did received few benefits from 
the initial GATT rounds.” Their effort to reform the international financial 
institutions did not succeed.
Attempts to address development issues through the Economic and Social 
Council  (ECOSOC)  led  to  the  formation  of  the  United  Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as an organ of the 
151 See United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Right to 
Development, 4 December 1986, GA Re. 41/128, UN Do. A/41/53 (1987)
152 This resulted in the super powers referring to the UN Security Council issues 
that they had previously referred to the General Assembly where they feared revolt 
of the newly decolonised States. Discussing the tensions this created in 
international relations, see Churchill, R.R. and Lowe, A.V. (1991) The Law of the 
Sea, Manchester University Press, p.180.
153 Orford, A (2001) “Globalisation and the Right to Development” in Alston , P. 
(2001) Peoples’ Rights, Oxford University Press, pp.127-184 at 129.
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General Assembly, where wider issues of international economic relations 
were to be addressed. Efforts to have development issues addressed in an 
integrated  way  through  the  major  international  economic  institutions, 
however, did not succeed. Attempts to reform the IMF, the World Bank 
and the GATT were remarkably unsuccessful. 
Clawed out of  the mouths of  an international  regime that  appears to be 
opposed to their economic liberation it is hardly surprising that although it 
is recognised in several UN instruments, opposition to the notion of the 
right  to  development  has  continued,  and the  meaning of  “development” 
itself has become an issue of contention. However, since 1989 the World 
Bank,  and  then  other  multilateral  development  banks,  have  sought  to 
integrate  the  issue  of  environmental  impact  and  assessment  into  their 
lending policies.154  This is significant for two reasons. First, it  marks a 
departure from the earlier polarisation on north south lines of the meaning 
of  the  right  to  development  since  its  emergence  in  late  1970s.  This 
demonstrates  that  the  right  to  development  has  become  an  increasingly 
important part of the United Nations human rights agenda even though it 
had not previously been adopted with equal  enthusiasm by international 
economic institutions.155 Secondly, this approach appears to implement the 
recommendations of  the Brundtland Commission156 that  prioritised inter-
generational equity. The Commission required that all States: 
1) meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs, and 
2) define the goals of economic and social development in terms of 
sustainability157 
154 See Boyle, A. and Freestone, D. (1999) International Law and Sustainable 
Development, Oxford University Press, p.10.
155 Orford, A (2001) “Globalisation and the Right to Development” in Alston , P. 
(2001) Peoples’ Rights, Oxford University Press, pp.127-184 at 128.
156 World Commission on Environment and Development, (1987) Our Common 
Future, Oxford University Press, New York.
157 Ibid. at 43.
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Concerns for  a global  policy that  linked sustainable development to  the 
concept  of  intergenerational  equity  has  a  long  history.158 However, 
development  of  multilateral  standards  for  its  implementation  is  more 
recent. The  Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (1972)159 which established man’s responsibility to protect the 
environment and the Earth’s natural resources, appears to have provided a 
significant standard benchmark for the standardisation of development and 
environmental issues. It required in Article 2 that “The natural resources of 
the  earth  including  the  air,  water,  land,  flora  and  fauna  and  especially 
representative samples of natural ecosystems must be safeguarded for the 
benefit  of  present  and  future  generations  through  careful  planning  or 
management,  as  appropriate”.  In  Article  1,  the  Convention  condemned 
apartheid, racial segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of 
oppression and foreign domination as factors that facilitated environmental 
damage and degradation.  In particular the crowding of ninety-five percent 
of an agro-economy based peasantry together with its livestock in less than 
ten  percent  of  the  land  with  the  least  potential  for  agricultural  use  in 
Rhodesia overwhelmed the land’s capacity to sustain human life of the area 
reserved for native use and quickly reduced it to semi-desert status. This 
made  the  status  quo both  unacceptable  and  unsustainable.   The  United 
Nations  Conference  on  Environment  and  Development160 (UNCED), 
commonly known as the Earth Summit, was held in Rio de Janeiro in June 
1992.  Representatives  of  178  governments  gathered  to  negotiate  an 
environmental bill of rights that would govern economic and environmental 
behaviour of peoples and nations. This resulted in:
158 Rachel Carson(1962) Silent Spring “brought together research on toxicology, 
ecology and epidemology to suggest that agricultural pesticides were building to 
catastrophic levels. This was linked to damage to animal species and to human 
health. It shattered the assumption that the environment had an infinite capacity to 
absorb pollutants”. See http://www.law.ecel.uwa.edu.au/intlaw/environment.htm 
(visited 25/03/03).
159 United Nations Conference on The Human Environment: Final Documents, 11 
I.L.M. 1416 (1972)
160 31 I.L.M. 814 (1992).
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1) the  Rio  Declaration  on  Environment  and  Development  -  an 
agreement of 27 principles that govern States parties’ conduct with 
regard to use of the environment and development issues; 
2) Agenda 21 - a detailed action blueprint on specific issues relating 
to  sustainable  development;  the  Convention  on  Biological 
Diversity  which  seeks  “…  to  conserve  biological  diversity, 
promote  the  sustainable  use  of  its  components,  and  encourage 
equitable sharing of the benefits  arising out  of  the utilization of 
genetic  resources.   Such  equitable  sharing  includes  appropriate 
access  to  genetic  resources,  as  well  as  appropriate  transfer  of 
technology, taking into account existing rights over such resources 
and such technology”,161 and 
3) the Framework Convention on Climate Change,162 which sets out to 
protect  the climate system for present and future generations by 
stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at  a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system.163 
161 See http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/register/reg-170.rrr.html (viewed 25/03/03)
162 See http://unfccc.int/resource/conv/conv_004.html (viewed 25/03/03)
163 Article 2.
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In common with most other multilateral agreements, the Rio Declaration 
begins  by  paying  homage  to  States  by  emphasising  their  sovereign 
authority to determine issues within their territories. Principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration (the Declaration) affirms the United Nations Charter sovereign 
right  of  States  to  exploit  their  own  resources  pursuant  to  their  own 
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of their national 
jurisdictions.  Immediately after that, the Declaration goes into issues that 
articulate  the  Declaration’s  focus.  Principles  3  and  4  collectively  fetter 
discharge of the sovereign right of States in Principle 2 by introducing the 
requirement  that  States  ought  equitably  to  meet  developmental  and 
environmental needs of present and future generations. The effect of these 
two principles is to direct substantially how States exercise their sovereign 
right  to  exploit  the  natural  resources  within  their  own  territories. 
Ultimately, States are enjoined as trustees to their  territories,  to balance 
present  economic  and  developmental  needs  with  those  of  succeeding 
generations. Weiss164 writes observes both an acceptance by States of this 
obligation and an encouraging interest to enforce them. 
In 1972, countries were debating whether environmental protection and 
economic development were consistent or antithetical to each other. … 
Since  1972,  nearly  every  country  has  adopted  one  or  more  pieces  of 
environmental  legislation.  In  addition,  there  are  more  than  870  legal 
instruments  in  which  at  least  some  provisions  are  concerned  with 
environmental issues.
164 See Weiss, E.D. (1992) Introductory Note to the United Nations Conference ob 
Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 814 .
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Humwe, Human Rights and Globalisation
This is the backdrop against which affected SADC States are conducting 
their land reform process. A backdrop that prioritises States’ international 
environmental law obligations of intergenerational equitable protection of 
the inherent dignity of  human beings. Principle 1 of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment (1972) suggests that that dignity 
requires and must be safeguarded by the guarantee of “… the fundamental 
right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, an environment 
of quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being” and in return for 
that  man  “  bears  a  solemn  responsibility  to  protect  and  improve  the 
environment for present and future generations”. From this is gained the 
view that SADC States that are reconstructing property rights within their 
territories have an obligation under international law to ensure that their 
reforms  are  consistent  with  the  requirement  to  protect  and  improve  the 
environment  for  present  and  future  generations.  Changes  in  access  to 
resources necessarily result in transformation of the economy and society. 
Planning and managing that change should be tempered by the need for 
social  equity  between  generations  as  well  as  equity  within  each 
generation.165 This  need-based  theory  of  economic  development  is  of 
course  problematic  viz  the  idea  of  inter-generational  equity  because  it 
assumes  determinability  of  the  needs  of  both  present  and  future 
generations.  Of  course  functional  physiological  needs  like  the  need  for 
clean air, a balanced lithosphere and atmosphere are givens at any time, but 
generic economic needs are more difficult to predict than that. Investing 
millions of pounds in the wrong product can be as costly as preserving a 
commodity  no  one  will  care  about  the  future.  But  land’s  qualities  of 
indestructibility, and limited supply for every nation coupled with man’s 
dependency on it, particularly in agrarian economies of developing States, 
makes it a prime sustainable development issue. Of course there is no unity 
about  what  is  meant  by  sustainable  development166 but  that  does  not 
altogether obliterate the idea. In fact some ideas are so complex, multi-
faceted and so broad that the definitional exercise loses effect with them 
because  no  attempt  to  generalise  them  can  succeed.   Sustainable 
development raises at once issues about poverty reduction, population size, 
ethics in technological development and its application, employment, trade 
etc. That no agreement has been reached yet on its definition points perhaps 
to the enormity and cumbersomeness of the idea but not to its redundancy. 
165 See World Commission on Environment and Development, (1987) Our 
Common Future, Oxford University Press, New York, p.43.
166 The Brundtland Report observed that arriving at a commonly accepted 
definition of sustainable development remains a challenge for all the actors in the 
development process. Ibid.
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Besides, there is nothing unusual about such delay. Although the crime of 
aggression  was  included  among  Article  5  crimes  of  the  Statute  of  the 
International  Criminal  Court  in  1998,  States  and  the  International  Law 
Commission were yet to agree its definition in spite of over fifty years of 
debating it. 
To sum up, an efficient land reform policy in affected SADC States is 
one that recognises that States’ sovereign right to determine within their 
own territories, the exploitation and development of their natural recourses 
is a fettered one. International law now obliges States to ensure that their 
developmental policies do not degrade the quality of both the people they 
are  intended  to  serve  and  the  environment.  It  obliges  States  to  adopt 
environmentally  sound  programmes  that  develop  and  sustain  the 
environment in order to achieve intergenerational equity in the utilisation of 
natural  resources.  That  requirement  supersedes  any  other  requirement 
particularly  because  it  guarantees  intergenerational  quality  of  life  by 
preventing  or  limiting  environmental  degradation.  This  hardly  needs 
emphasising  to  SADC States  most  of  which  have  direct  experience  of 
desertification in areas previously reserved for native communities under 
policies that  created the current land crisis.  Adoption of inefficient land 
reform  programmes  whilst  attempting  to  redress  the  inequitable  land 
distribution  authored  by  colonial  authorities  may  soon  result  in 
desertification  of  the  land  being  re-allocated  as  well.  That  is  a  grim 
prospect that must be avoided. 
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Political abuse of the land issue to divert attention from economic 
failure of governments results in counterproductive, destabilising, random, 
unstructured  and  misguided  land-grab,  and  conflict-flaring  situations.  It 
explodes rather than address an issue on which agro-based economies and 
their  populations  depend on.  It  compounds national  problems that  went 
before the said explosion, creating economic, social and political instability 
for the State and its neighbours as people are forced to relocate for all sorts 
of  reasons. For this  reason it  may be said to be senseless.  Whereas the 
previous landholders had legal titles that they could lease, sell or use as 
surety for loans that provided capital for land developmental programmes, 
the  misguided,  unstructured  random  politically  motivated  land-grab 
situations do not offer such opportunities at all. Water projects, forestation 
programmes and research into innovative means of technologically utilising 
land  are  abandoned  in  favour  of  outdated  methods  that  threaten 
environmental  degradation  and  international  law’s  policy  of 
intergenerational equity. Surely they threaten economic collapse of these 
agro-based  economies.  Absence  of  land  management  and  development 
initiatives means certain degradation of the human environment that must 
be cared for in order for it to care for its users and succeeding generations. 
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4.6. A strategy for efficient resolution of past and continuing social 
injustices that are rooted in colonial or some such other similar 
experience of States: A proposal 
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If  we  accept  that  the  world  of  exclusive  sovereignty  and  intractable 
independence has largely given way to the present one of pooled sovereign 
competences  and  interdependence  across  a  whole  range  of  human 
experiences, then we might accept also that isolationist policies are the least 
efficient means of conducting national affairs in the new world. Yet the 
rhetoric  surrounding  political  decisions  regarding  the  land  issue  in  the 
SADC suggests that its leaders like to both embrace the new world scheme 
when it  suits  them, and to  turn away from it  when their  actions are  at 
variance with opinio communitatis. Opinio Communitatis refers to rules of 
international law that are widely supported by States.167 International law 
prohibits in the strongest terms possible assertions of racial superiority.168 It 
is  averse  to  the  practice  of  ethnic  cleansing.169 The  Daily  Telegraph170 
quotes  President  Mugabe  describing  himself  in  the  context  of  his  land 
reform policy as the Hitler of the time. “I am still the Hitler of the time. 
This Hitler has only one objective, justice for his own people, sovereignty 
for  his  people,  recognition of the  independence of his  people,  and their 
right to their resources.” This isolationist approach to conduct of national 
affairs is most unfortunate because in many cases, resolution of particular 
national situations depends on, and is influenced by unsynchronised events 
happening elsewhere in the world and over which affected States have no 
control over whatsoever. This reliance on others that we have no sovereign 
authority over but on whose choices resolution of our own circumstance 
depends, is the reason for the departure in recent times from monolithic 
conceptions of sovereignty to that of shared sovereign competences which 
recognises  and  privileges  strategies  of  national  conduct  that  facilitate 
interdependence  of  States  and  of  their  citizens.  Nations  can  no  longer 
escape the fact that they exist in a context of perpetual co-existence and 
interdependence with others and that co-operation with others is as vital as 
competition  which  characterises  that  relationship.  Indeed  nations  have 
come  to  realise  that  environmental  concerns  can  only  be  addressed 
collectively,  and  that  no  nation  can  do  so  single-handedly,  whatever 
resources  may  be  at  its  disposal.  They  have  come  to  accept  too  that 
167 See Lee, R. (1995) “Rule Making in the United Nations: Opinion 
Communitatis” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 
vol. 27 No. 33 p.571.
168 See Chigara, B. (2002) Amnesty in International Law: The legality under 
International Law of National Amnesty Laws, Longman, London, pp.125-62.
169 NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, was prompted by President 
Milosevic’s policy of ethnic cleansing against sections of his population.
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cooperation  with  one  another  for  mutual  good  does  not  preclude  their 
competition against one another for the hand of those that can secure or 
provide employment opportunities for their nationals. Acknowledgment of 
this reality by those responsible in the SADC for land reform policy would 
benefit  thinking about  the targets that  humwe sponsored reforms should 
meet.  International  business  that  every  nation  longs  to  attract  onto  its 
shores, international organizations that promote protection of human rights 
standards, and civilised society in general is averse to humwe inspired land 
reform policies, which are characterised by violent crimes that are subject 
matter of the ICC, human rights abuse, unfair procedures, ethnic cleansing 
of the society, create instability and poverty and undermine land’s utility, 
as much as much as they are adverse to maintenance or creation of new 
racist institutions in any national community. For this reason, the economic 
and social progress of any State depends not on indulging in policies that 
alienate  and  isolate  the  State  from  the  support  of  other  States  but  in 
adopting policies that favour promotion and protection of the dignity of its 
inhabitants.  Undoing past and continuing injustices that are linked to its 
colonial or some such similar experience of the State is itself no licence to 
social and economic vagrancy. In fact it is something that requires humility 
of  its  executioners  because  international  law  requires  them  to  apply 
standards and practices that are immune to the processes that authored the 
injustice in the first place. It requires discovery of human values at their 
best and not at their worst. At best, human beings are fair, equity oriented 
and protective of  their fellow human being’s dignity. At worst  they are 
destructive,  insensitive  dimwits.  Creatively  applied  by  disciples  of  the 
universal human rights culture – which is what international law obliges 
governments and offers  them immunity from prosecution for” –  humwe 
should be adapted to ensure:
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1) Those social, political and economic gains of previous years do not 
go to waste.
2) Healing occurs of nation’s social hurt arising from years of the said 
social injustice. 
3) Creation of a more cohesive society. 
4) Efficient use of natural and human resources to create sustainable 
domestic and international markets for agricultural products of the 
State and its region. 
5) Sufficiency of food production.
6) Practices that guarantee sustainable development.
7) Practices  that  pursue  the  policy  of  seeking  to  achieve 
intergenerational equity.
8) Retention of land’s utility as property and capital venture.
9) Protection of the inherent dignity of all persons concerned with that 
agenda.
10) Effective dissemination of the objectives of the reform programme 
and its contribution to the overall responsibility of the State to its 
citizens,  its  geographic  region  and  the  wider  international 
community.
11) Skills  training for the “new peasant farmer of the 21st century ” 
who  holds  and  uses  land  in  trust  to  future  generations  and  to 
present international concerns
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Guaranteeing  of  these  attributes  would  reinforce  humwe’s  legitimacy 
among all  parties involved and also within the international community, 
which has the power to approve or disapprove of the effort during and after 
its  resolution. By seeking to protect the inherent dignity of every single 
stakeholder in the land issue, humwe land reform policy that is tempered by 
these  attributes  ultimately  protects  the  whole  national  community  from 
further social injustice. By managing the problem without taking ownership 
of it,  humwe land reform agendas tempered by these attributes empower 
stakeholders by inspiring confidence in the resolution at which they arrive. 
By making stakeholders work together to reach a settlement,  humwe land 
reform  agendas  tempered  by  these  attributes  give  stakeholders  ample 
opportunity to discover each other’s suffering, pain and experience of their 
collective situation.  Such understanding can deal with the pain that would 
otherwise  trigger  an insatiable quest  for  revenge by whoever feels  hard 
done by the whole experience. It delegitimises hate opportunists that may 
prefer either to uphold the status quo or completely to reverse the tables in 
favour of  the abused majority.  This would result  in  an efficient  humwe 
principle  that  preserved  those  social,  political  and  economic  gains  of 
previous years, facilitated healing of the nation’s social hurt arising from 
years of the said social injustice, created a more cohesive society, targeted 
sustainable intergenerational equity in the exploitation and development of 
both human and natural resources, retained land’s utility as property and 
capital venture, and above all protected the inherent dignity of all persons 
concerned  with  that  agenda  by  empowering  them  access  to  land  and 
equipping them with skills that enabled them efficiently to interact with 
that resource  –  humwefficiency.  Humwefficiency  should substitute  humwe 
practice because events in Zimbabwe show that unbridled humwe practice, 
in spite of its virtues of social justice, distributive justice and restorative 
justice,  is  open  to  abuse  which  undermines  notions  of  equality  among 
inhabitants  and  allows  for  unnecessary  destabilisation  of  the  social, 
political and economic order of society, widespread human rights abuse, 
corruption,  devaluation  of  land’s  utility  as  property  and  general  social 
decay  –  what  we  might  call  deficient  humwe  practice that  is  also 
inconsistent  with the human rights  culture that  now dominates  all  other 
cultures known to man. By alienating those that might otherwise have been 
eager to invest in the country, deficient humwe practice appears to oppose 
economic development of the SADC. By compromising food production 
and supply in the region, deficient humwe practice stupifies the noble goal 
of  equitable  access  to  land.  Absence  of  land  management  training 
programmes for peasants being offered land previously held by commercial 
farmers suggests that intergenerational equity and sustainable development 
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are remote issues in  deficient humwe practice. With time, more and more 
land might be lost to desertification while more and more people clamour 
for pieces of land from which to eke a living in these agrarian economies. 
This  casts  deficient  humwe  practice  as  an  unlikely  tool  for  successful 
reform  of  past  and  continuing  social  injustices  that  are  connected  to 
colonial  or  some  such  other  similar  experience  of  States  and 
humwefficiency as its most suited replacement. Situations of social injustice 
mirror possibilities of social justice that they have been privileged over. 
War could be said to mirror both the absence and possibility of peace. In 
the shadows of the discord of apartheid South Africa for instance, lay the 
possibility of a symphony of an integrated inter-racial democratic country. 
Whether that has or will be achieved is open to debate. South Africa must 
resolve the past and continuing injustice of inequitable distribution of the 
one resource that determines the welfare of all its inhabitants: land. This 
must happen in better fashion than has occurred in Zimbabwe. South Africa 
is arguably Africa’s most affluent nation and has a much higher price to 
pay  if  its  land  reform policy  goes  Zimbabwe’s  way.  South  Africa  and 





This chapter analysed humwe’s capacity efficiently to resolve the land issue 
in SADC States.  It  examined  humwe’s social justice agenda and human 
rights pedigree against the backdrop of the international microeconomics 
that inevitably interact with it.  It  argued for strategies to be attached to 
humwe’s agenda  that  complement  humwe to  achieve:  (1)  market 
competitiveness of the SADC, (2) market efficiency of the SADC, and (3) 
sustainability of the SADC economy. It observed that we live in a world of 
globalising processes that impose particular limitations on any one State’s 
capacity to do as it  pleases under the cloak of sovereign independence, 
particularly  where  economic  and  human  rights  issues  are  concerned.  It 
discussed requirements imposed by global factors such as environmental 
protection and preservation and the notion of intergenerational equity on 
land reform policy of SADC States. It concluded that these requirements 
present  challenges  which  compel  sovereign  independent  States  to 
counterbalance their national self-interest171 with international  expectation, 
also  known  as  opinio  communitatis. It  considered  that  the  ultimate 
171 Examining the grip on State practice of ‘state interest’see Henkin, L. (2nd ed. 
1979) How Nations Behave, Columbia University Press, New York.
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objective  of  the  SADC  is  to  progressively  harmonise  Member  States’ 
microeconomic  policies  towards  establishment, incrementally,  of  a  free 
trade  zone,  a  customs  union  and  ultimately  full  economic  union  with 
integrated monetary and fiscal systems and a regional parliament by the 
year 2034, and concluded that it is in the interest of the organization that 
land reform strategies adopted by member States facilitate realisation of 
this objective. It showed that in spite of its human rights pedigree, humwe 
had inherent defects that cast it as a lame candidate in the effort to resolve 
past  and continuing injustices  connected to colonial  or  some such other 
historical  experience  of  States.  In  spite  of  its  virtues  of  social  justice, 
distributive  justice  and  restorative  justice  humwe  is  open  to  abuse  that 
undermines  notions  of  equality  among  inhabitants  and  allows  for 
unnecessary destabilisation of the social, political and economic order of 
society, widespread human rights abuse, corruption, devaluation of land’s 
utility as property and general social decay – what we might call deficient  
humwe practice, which is also inconsistent with the human rights culture 
that now dominates all other cultures known to man. By alienating those 
that might  otherwise have been eager to invest in the country,  deficient  
humwe practice appears to oppose economic development of the SADC. 
By  compromising  food  production  and  supply  in  the  region,  deficient  
humwe  practice stupifies  the  noble  goal  of  equitable  access  to  land. 
Absence  of  land  management  training  programmes  for  peasants  being 
offered  land  previously  held  by  commercial  farmers  suggests  that 
intergenerational equity and sustainable development are remote issues in 
deficient humwe practice. With time, more and more land might be lost to 
desertification while more and more people clamour for pieces of land from 
which to eke a living in these agrarian economies. It considered how, if at 
all  opinio  communitatis  might  influence  or  affect  humwe dynamics.  It 
proposed  the  theory  of  humwefficiency that  combines  requirements  of 
opinio communitatis with humwe’s virtues in order to limit, or if possible, 
get rid of humwe’s inherent defects altogether and to mobilise its force for 
good in the effort to resolve justiciably and efficiently past and continuing 
injustices that are rooted in colonial or some such other similar experience 
of States. It argued that efficient resolution of the land issue that is linked to 
colonial or some such other similar experience of the State is constrained 
by international law’s requirements of economic development of States that 
meets  the  requirements  of  intergenerational  equity,  sustainable 
development and also submits to the dictates of the universal human rights 
culture that has become the world’s dominant culture. Journalists talk about 
this  culture.  States’  legislative  acts  refer  and  defer  to  this  culture. 
Historians,  economists  and  even  criminals  and  prisoners  talk  about  this 
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culture  and  invoke  duties  and  rights  that  judicial  systems  of  civilised 
nations recognise. This is clear evidence of the dominance of human rights 
culture in the contemporary world.
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